Nike's Labor Practices in the
Three Years Since CEO Phil Knight's
Speech to the National Press Club
May 2001
By Tim Connor
Published by Global Exchange
Executive Summary
On May 12, 1998, Nike's CEO and founder Mr. Phillip Knight spoke
at the National Press Club in Washington, DC and made what were, in
his words, "some fairly significant announcements" regarding Nike's
policies on working conditions in its supplier factories.
The announcements received favorable treatment from the press,
with a New York Times editorial suggesting that Nike's new reforms
"set a standard that other companies should match."
Nike's critics were more cautious, expressing concern that
Knight's promises represented an attempt to sideline their demands for
decent wages and rigorous factory monitoring and replace them with a
significantly weaker reform agenda.
This report represents a comprehensive examination of Nike's labor
performance in the three years since that speech was made. That
performance is first assessed against the commitments Knight announced
and is then compared with the human rights standards and independent
monitoring practices labor rights organizations have demanded of the
company.
Knight's May 12 Promises: What Have They Meant for Workers?
Knight made six commitments:
1st Promise: All Nike shoe factories will meet the
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) standards
in indoor air quality.
Nike was the subject of considerable scandal in 1997 when it was
revealed that workers in one of its contract factories were being
exposed to toxic fumes at up to 177 times the Vietnamese legal
limit. Although Nike claims that its factories now meet OSHA
standards, it gives factory managers advance notice of testing, giving
them considerable scope to change chemical use to minimize emissions
on the day the test is conducted. Nike is also not yet willing to
regularly make the results of those tests available to the interested
public. Rights groups have challenged Nike to put in place a
transparent system of monitoring factory safety standards involving
unannounced monitoring visits by trained industrial hygienists.
2nd Promise: The minimum age for Nike factory workers will be
raised to 18 for footwear factories and 16 for apparel factories.
Nike was severely embarrassed on the child labor issue in 1996
when a major story in Life magazine featured a photograph of a very
young Pakistani boy sewing a Nike soccer ball. Evidence continues to
emerge of young persons under the age of 16 employed in Nike contract
factories. In the absence of economic development in their
communities, however, excluding children from factories may force them
into even more dangerous and degrading work. Global Exchange believes
that payment of a living wage to adult workers would be by far the
most effective means of benefiting children in areas in which Nike's
goods are made.
3rd Promise: Nike will include non-government organizations in
its factory monitoring, with summaries of that monitoring released to
the public.
As far as rights groups are concerned, this was the most important
of Knight's promises. Three years after it was made, Nike has
contracted one non-profit organization to conduct one audit of one
factory and is able to list a number of other NGOs with which it has
held discussions which it claims will improve its monitoring
program. What the company is still unable to say is which NGOs, if
any, will be allowed to regularly monitor factory conditions and when
summary statements of that monitoring will be released.
4th Promise: Nike will expand its worker education program,
making free high school equivalency courses available to all workers
in Nike footwear factories.
The education program has expanded, but wages paid in Nike
factories are so low that the great majority of workers cannot afford
to give up overtime income in order to take one of the
courses. Payment of a living wage would give Nike workers with an
interest in achieving a high school education the time and the means
to do so.
5th Promise: Nike will expand its micro-enterprise loan program
to benefit four thousand families in Vietnam, Indonesia, Pakistan, and
Thailand.
It is much cheaper for Nike to give micro-loans to several
thousand individuals outside Nike factories than to ensure that the
530,000 workers producing the company's product are paid a wage that
would allow them to live with dignity. Nike's first responsibility is
to the workers in its production chain. The company should commit to a
living wage before it seeks public relations kudos by funding
charitable programs like this.
6th Promise: Funding university research and open forums on
responsible business practices, including programs at four
universities in the 1998-99 academic year.
The company has refused reputable academics access to Nike
factories to conduct research, and that research it has funded seems
geared to providing private information to Nike rather than
stimulating academic debate and increasing knowledge. If Nike is
genuinely interested in investing in credible academic research into
responsible business practices, the company should establish an
independent committee made up of reputable and independent academics
to determine which research should be funded.
Sins of Omission: What Labor Rights Groups Wish Knight Had Promised
The demands which rights groups have made of Nike but which Nike
has deliberately ignored can also be grouped into six categories:
1st Demand: Protect workers who speak honestly about factory
conditions.
Nike's track record in protecting workers who blow the whistle on
sweatshop conditions is very poor. The company has turned its back on
individual workers who have been victimized for speaking to
journalists, and has cut and run from other factories after labor
abuses have been publicized. Until this changes, Nike workers will
have good reason to keep silent about factory conditions for fear that
speaking honestly may result in them and their fellow workers losing
their jobs.
2nd Demand: Regular, Transparent, Independent and Confidential
Procedures for Monitoring Factories and Investigating Worker
Complaints.
Activists have repeatedly asked Nike to allow rights groups to
educate workers about their rights and to ensure workers can make
confidential complaints to independent monitors when those rights are
infringed.
Instead, Nike has made it the responsibility of each factory to
educate workers about Nike's code of conduct and to establish a
complaint mechanism. This deliberately ignores the interest factory
owners have in keeping workers ignorant of their rights. All
independent research indicates that the overwhelming majority of Nike
workers do not understand their rights under Nike's code and do not
believe factory owners can be trusted to resolve worker grievances.
Rights groups have also called for a factory monitoring program
which is independent and rigorous. In response Nike has set up an
elaborate array of different schemes for monitoring and factory
assessment. While this variety of programs looks impressive in a
public relations sense, Nike has deliberately set up each of these
programs so that they fail two or more of the key tests of effective
monitoring: independence, transparency, regularity and a relationship
of trust with workers.
The quarterly program of S.A.F.E. (Safety, Health, Attitude,
People, Environment) assessments, conducted by Nike staff, is
obviously the least independent. There is no evidence that Nike staff
actually interview workers as part of these assessments let alone
attempts to establish a relationship of trust with them.
Nike's program of annual factory monitoring by
PricewaterhouseCoopers also lacks independence. PwC was selected by
Nike, reports to Nike and conducts a monitoring program designed by
Nike. To the extent that independent observation of PwC's monitoring
practice has been allowed, it indicates that PwC auditors fail to
establish a relationship of trust with workers and that the quality of
their monitoring can be extremely poor. Dara O'Rourke (an assistant
professor at MIT) recently observed several PwC factory audits first
hand and concluded that they had "significant and seemingly systematic
biases" in favor of factory owners and against the interests of
workers (O'Rourke 2000).
While there are elements of the Fair Labor Association's (FLA)
proposed monitoring program that represent important improvements on
Nike's current very poor system, the Association's ability to ensure
that workers' rights are respected will be significantly undermined
both by the questionable independence of its external monitors and by
the long delays between factory monitoring visits--which will on
average occur in each factory only once every ten years. The Global
Alliance for Workers and Communities is an attempt by Nike to shift
focus away from the human rights agenda promoted by the company's
critics. The Alliance deliberately avoids investigating key human
rights issues and its research methodology does not allow time for
researchers to create a relationship of trust with workers.
Nike has vigorously opposed the Workers' Rights Consortium, a
factory monitoring program that is independent, transparent and makes
it a priority to build relationships of trust with workers. In
contrast, Nike's monitoring and factory assessment programs are not
independent, lack full transparency and have so far made very little
effort to win workers' trust so that they can speak honestly about
factory conditions without fear of reprisal.
3rd Demand: Decent Wages
Nike has rejected demands that it ensures that Nike workers are
paid a living wage--that is, a full time wage that would provide a
small family with an adequate diet and housing and other basic
necessities. Instead, the company has used statistics selectively and
in a misleading fashion to give the false impression that wages
currently paid to Nike workers are fair and adequate. Meanwhile those
workers struggle to survive on wages that are barely enough to cover
their individual needs, let alone those of their children.
4th Demand: Reasonable Working Hours
Independent research indicates that in many factories Nike workers
are still being coerced into working up to 70 hours per week and are
being humiliated in front of other workers or threatened with
dismissal if they refuse. Nike workers also frequently report that it
is extremely difficult to obtain sick leave and that the annual leave
to which they are legally entitled is often refused, reduced or
replaced with cash without the worker having any choice in the matter.
5th Demand: Safe and Healthy Workplaces
Nike has made important progress in reducing the use of toxic
chemicals in sportshoe production. Unfortunately, on the few occasions
in recent years that genuinely independent health and safety experts
have been allowed access to Nike contract factories, they have found
serious hazards including still dangerously high levels of exposure to
toxic chemicals, inadequate personal protective equipment, and lack of
appropriate guards to protect workers from dangerous machinery. There
is also considerable evidence of workers suffering stress from
spending large amounts of time in high pressure and frequently abusive
work environments.
6th Demand: Respect for Workers' Right to Freedom of Association
So far Nike's promise to protect this right has been largely
empty. A considerable proportion of Nike's goods are made in countries
like China where independent unions are illegal. Nike has refused to
call on the Chinese government to allow workers to organize and has
actively opposed calls for trade pressure to be put on the Chinese
government to encourage it to improve its record in this area.
Nike has abjectly failed to prevent the suppression of unions in a
number of its contract factories, including the PT Nikomas Gemilang
and PT ADF factories in Indonesia, the Sewon and Wei Li Textile
factories in China, the Formosa factory in El Salvador, the Natural
Garment factory in Cambodia, the Savina factory in Bulgaria and
factories owned by the Saha Union group and the Bangkok Rubber group
as well as the Nice Apparel, De-Luxe, Lian Thai and Par Garment
factories in Thailand.
On those few occasions when Nike has taken any steps to advance
this right in specific factories, it has done so grudgingly and after
considerable public pressure. While elements of Nike's eventual
response to the current dispute in the Kuk Dong factory in Mexico have
been positive, Nike's actions on the issue been characterized by
unnecessary delays, lack of follow through and failure to actively
promote the urgent need for a free and fair union election.
Conclusion
Thus far Nike has treated sweatshop allegations as an issue of
public relations rather than human rights. The promises made by
Phillip Knight in his May 1998 speech were an attempt by the company
to switch the media focus to issues it was willing to address while
avoiding the key problems of subsistence wages, forced overtime and
suppression of workers' right to freedom of association.
The projects Knight announced have been of little benefit to Nike
workers. Some have helped only a tiny minority, or else have no
relevance to Nike factories at all. The most significant promise, to
allow NGOs to monitor its factories and release summary statements of
that monitoring, has simply not been fulfilled.
Health and safety is the one area where some improvement has
occurred. But even here the company is not willing to put in place a
transparent monitoring system involving unannounced factory visits. On
the few occasions when independent safety experts have been allowed to
visit Nike factories, they invariably have found very serious hazards.
The inaction of the last three years shows that rights groups are
justified in treating the company with suspicion and demanding that
factory monitoring be both genuinely independent from Nike's control
and publicly reported in full. While Nike touts itself as an "industry
leader" in corporate responsibility, Nike workers are still forced to
work excessive hours in high pressure work environments, are not paid
enough to meet the most basic needs of their children, and are subject
to harassment, dismissal and violent intimidation if they try to form
unions or tell journalists about labor abuses in their factories. The
time has come for the company to adopt the reforms which rights groups
have advocated. It is indefensible that activists, consumers and most
importantly Nike factory workers are still waiting for Nike to do it.