Cry for Regional Autonomy Tied to Cultural Divide? Bolivia is in grave danger of setting the stage where it could later split into two parts if an immediate diplomatic offensive is not quickly launched by the OAS and the international community. To counter this, outside observers fear that the natural gas and agriculture-rich departments of Santa Cruz and Tarija could be marching down an irreversible course that may culminate in their seceding from the Bolivian republic.

In the lowland department of Santa Cruz, business entrepreneurs, oil tycoons and soy farmers comprise a prosperous and privileged clan. On January 28, led by pro-business Santa Cruz Civic Committee leader Rubén Costas, this group took the first step toward declaring regional self-rule. They established a provisional committee, one move shy of electing a de facto governor. Approximately 300,000 demonstrators rallied throughout the departmental capital Santa Cruz in support of Costas' demand for increased financial and political control over the region. The department's export-oriented economy, which together with the nearby department of Tarija's resource-laden deposits, makes up 40 percent of Bolivia's underperforming tax-base due to their rich caches of natural gas and agricultural enterprises and attracts most of the incoming foreign investment. Santa Cruz autonomy boosters contend that the La Paz-based central government has squandered revenues collected from their residents to pay for costly, but poorly administered, public services in the country's purportedly more backward western highland region.

Santa Cruz has all but written off the now poor highlands, which once almost alone financially supported the land-locked country. For more than 500 years it was altiplano labor which facilitated the extraction of silver deposits from the fabulous mountain of Potosí. Now, say the nationalists, the time has come for the wealthy cruceño elite—whose department already has received the lion's share of funds for the country's infrastructural development as well as gained the bulk of new investment coming into the country over the past 40 years—to reciprocate.

President Carlos Mesa, attempting to placate the militant protests against him last month, and in order to appease the demands of pro-autonomy demonstrators, issued a decree setting gubernatorial elections for June 12. Mesa's decision, which amounted to a capitulating to the cruceño position, represents, some critics say, a violation of the nation's constitution, which holds that prefects, or governors of Bolivia's nine departments, have to be appointed by the president. After three pro and con protests against him in less than two weeks, the increasingly beleaguered Mesa also scaled back an IMF-pressured December 30 fuel price increase from an originally mandated 23 percent hike to one of 15 percent. In order to save his presidency, he also was persuaded to push for the cancellation of a private foreign water contract in the community of El Alto, in metro La Paz.

Wealthy Region Seeks Greater Self-Rule Important regional political figures and wealthy residents of Santa Cruz protested, from a pro-autonomy perspective, for two weeks leading up to Santa Cruz's January 28 actions. They were joined in the demonstration by like-minded protesters from the natural gas-laden southern department of Tarija. The oil-rich and agro-business-driven department of Santa Cruz, combined with gas producing Tarija, account for a majority of the country's GDP. According to Marco Gandarillas, economics expert at the Cochabamba-based Bolivian Center for Documentation and Information (CEDIB), it is clear that calls from well-heeled residents of Santa Cruz and Tarija, while veiled by the clamor for greater self-rule, were likely hiding an ulterior, economic motive. "The demands of the cruceño fascist and racist oligarchy propose a departmental autonomy which would serve very well their interests for control of the land and gas reserves," said Gandarillas in an interview with COHA. The recent upsurge of demands for self-rule could be nothing more, according to him, than a selfish power-grab by a select few cruceños who bemoan the lamentable divide that separates Santa Cruz from the rest of Bolivia, but who would also enormously benefit from institutionalizing such a cleavage.

Santa Cruz's most valuable gas caches are to be found in the Chaco region south of the bustling metropolis, where the citizenry is predominantly of Guaraní indigenous descent. The Guaranis, who live in Santa Cruz, Tarija and Chuquisaca (Sucre) departments are calling for the creation of a tenth national department under their control. For their part, the white elite of Santa Cruz want increased political authority, but not necessarily secession at this stage, in order to manage the allocation of, and control over these national resources. Only 25 landowners own approximately 22 million hectares of land in Santa Cruz, according to the government's Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA). To give some perspective, the last figure represents nearly 60 percent of the department's entire territory.

The pro-business Santa Cruz Civic Committee, which is spearheading pro-autonomy efforts, already has taken action by seizing control of the department's land reform agency in an effort to curb the resettlement of peasants onto presently un-worked huge tracts of arable -- and extremely valuable -- federal territory. "Mostly poor Quechua and Aymara-speaking peasants have migrated to Santa Cruz over the last 50 years to colonize what was once state land and try to make a go of small-scale agriculture production," said anthropologist Lesley Gill, a professor at American University in Washington, D.C., in an interview with COHA.

Power grabs by Costas' committee will unquestionably yield dire consequences for subsistence farmers who are attempting to eke out an existence from small plots of land and are already stressed out by neoliberal policies. Such moves would be rendered far easier under an autonomous regional government unaffected by federal oversight from La Paz, 338 miles to the west.

Cries for Autonomy Far From Representative While the white-elite of Santa Cruz contends that its actions are in the best interests of the country's population, including even poor cruceños, neither the region nor the nation is united over Costas' pro-autonomy bent. The Coordinator of Ethnic Towns of Santa Cruz (CPESC)—an anti-autonomy movement comprised mainly of peasant farmers, teachers and human rights activists—staged a counter protest on January 27 that drew 5,000 opposition demonstrators to a rally in protest of the game plan of the department's oligarchy. Furthermore, nine out of ten recently elected mayors representing Bolivia's major cities have thrown their collective support behind Mesa and the central government, acting as a counterweight against Costas and his pro-business and land owners' constituency. While perhaps wary about Mesa's ever-changing politics, the mayors prefer the embattled president as at least a "democratic" alternative to Santa Cruz's current offering. Infuriated Bolivians across the country contend that the prosperous and predominantly white southeastern region's desire for self-rule is rooted—economic motivations aside—largely in racist beliefs.

Secession to Maintain Ethnic Divide Santa Cruz's European-descended business elite has long desired a separatist rupture with the largely indigenous populations of the western highlands, comprised mainly of Quechua and Aymara-speaking peoples. Accounting for 55 percent of the country's 8 million citizens, the Andean nation's indigenous rely predominantly on subsistence farming and coca production as a means of survival, contributing little to the nation's industrial economy. Predominantly white and mestizo Santa Cruz, home to 2.4 million, is reputed to be the country's economic engine and historically has been chauvinistically proud of its European roots, which date back to the Spanish conquest. "The wealthy, 'white' agro-industrialists [...] view themselves as racially superior to the poor peasants of the highlands. They view the [poor peasants] as contributing little or nothing to the national wealth," commented Gill. While recent protests by the elite demonstrate frustration on the part of the prosperous lowland's over the historical split in Bolivia's economy between poor and rich, they also highlight deep racial tensions.

Santa Cruz plays host to two fiercely right-wing groups—the Cruceñista Youth, whose para-fascist ideals and actions have been broadly juxtaposed by some to the Nazi Hitler Youth movement, and the Movement for the Liberation of the Camba Nation (Nación Camba). Both groups are known for carrying out violent attacks against members of the Landless Movement, as well as subsistence peasant farmers. The larger and more vocal Nación Camba, which boasts 40,000 predominantly white and mestizo backers from both Santa Cruz and Tarija, advocates the creation of a "new Bolivia" by means of regional separation. Despite claims on the Nación Camba website that the group "rejects any form of racism," the movement's Youth Group branch was responsible for the October 2003 stoning of a large group of indigenous people attempting to enter the city of Santa Cruz in protest of former president Sanchez de Lózada's decision to export natural gas reserves.

Conveniently, direct support for Nación Camba, which claims 5,000 militants who are prepared to take up arms in support of their cause, comes from the Santa Cruz Chamber of Commerce (CAINCO), a body charged with representing the interests of 1,500 foreign and domestic companies holding investments in the department. Its long list of business members includes international gas companies holding gas contracts in the region, such as Repsol-YPF, Brazilian state-owned Petrobras and the notorious U.S. energy company, Enron. Each of these sectors, coincidentally, has representation on CAINCO's board of directors.

Constitutional Assembly, Enemy of the Secessionist State Other departments, politicians and analysts agree on the need for decentralization, yet insist on holding off on making any structural changes until the National Constitutional Assembly (Asamblea Constituyente) convenes, which is slated to begin in August.

However, there are now serious concerns that the autonomy referendum set for June will indefinitely postpone the constitutional assembly, which was promised by Mesa when he ascended to office after Sánchez de Lozada fled the country. The assembly is intended to rewrite the nation's constitution while carefully considering representative input from each of the country's departments. Staging of the nation-wide assembly, which would allow a broader debate regarding the manner in which Bolivia's government will be structured and how political power, if at all, should be partitioned, fills cruceño and Tarija elites with great apprehension. The more the representative assembly allows an increasingly politically powerful and left-of-center indigenous movement to gain influence, the more the rich and middle class will have to fear. At the top of the list of those who breed concern are Evo Morales of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, as well as Jamie Solares and Felipe Quispe, the heads of the Bolivian Trade Union Federation (COB) and the Confederation of Peasants' Unions (CSUTCB), respectively. These groups can be expected to lobby for a more equitable distribution of political power. Costas' group, however, wants no part in the process and would prefer to create their own almost separate political entities.

It is important to note that a majority of departments support elected rather than executive-appointed governors. However, their leaders feel that the required constitutional change should be made via the anticipated constitutional assembly and not through another costly referendum that subverts the process as a whole and will be used by pro-autonomy forces to undermine Bolivian sovereignty.

Protests Decrying Mesa's Performance Oppositional forces on both the right and left could provide a major challenge to the man who assumed power from his post as vice president after former President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada had stepped down in response to a popular outcry against his pro-business and neoliberal policies in October 2003. This was after he had called out the troops, resulting in the deaths of 59 demonstrators. Recent popular protests have highlighted issues which the general public demands be addressed, such as constitutional reform and, most recently, increased petrol and diesel prices. The severe mishandling of one of Latin America's most under-performing economies, in which 58 percent of the country survives on daily incomes below $2 per day, is another core reason for much of the agitation.

Bolivians rallied in the tens of thousands across the country in January, displaying their anger over Mesa's decision to raise diesel and petrol prices by 23 and 10 percent, respectively, a move spurred by IMF pressure. Mesa claimed that these mandated price increases were aimed at offsetting an increasing budget deficit and to curb the illegal smuggling of fuel to neighboring Chile and Argentina, where its price of those fuels had grown increasingly more expensive due to low supplies. These and recent protests in El Alto, which brought about the cancellation of the state's privatized water and sewage contract with Aguas de Illimani, represent mounting popular dissatisfaction regarding the manner in which the multicultural nation's finances and affairs were being handled—as well as sheer revulsion over the neoliberal policies which Mesa continues to employ.

Mesa Teetering on Rocky Ground, Hollow Promises? After winning a narrow victory in the July 2004 referendum which ambiguously called for an increase in state control over natural gas and paved the way for the development and export of reserves valued at more than $70 billion, Mesa began to act as if he had consolidated his position as the Andean nation's anointed leader.

However, since Bolivians narrowly and somewhat confusedly approved the gas export measure, the president has had to face a strong and adverse public tide as well as congressional opposition over a wide-range of issues. While Bolivians voted narrowly in the July 2004 referendum to nationalize their natural gas resources, the manner in which their La Paz government will do so is still being formulated and heatedly debated. At present, seven different proposals for a new hydrocarbon law, each dictating varying levels of state control over the natural resource, are up for congressional debate.

Despite a poll published on January 25 by the public opinion firm Mitofsky International which showed Mesa commanding 55 percent of popular support, the president's continual flip-flopping on issues such as land reform, his near nuptial relations with multinational corporations and a failure thus far to make promised inroads into re-examining the grossly unpopular neoliberal policies of his predecessor, leave him increasingly exposed to political attacks. Maria Lohman, communication director of CEDIB, stated in an interview with COHA that diminishing support for Mesa is to some extent a result of his failure to depart, as pledged, from the odious policies of his heartily disliked predecessor: "Mesa's orientation is to maintain, by whatever means possible, the fundamental politics of privatization to assure transnational companies their profits, earned in an ocean of corruption and illegality [...] his neoliberal government is a continuation of Goni [nickname for former president Sánchez de Lozada]."

Despite promises to re-nationalize gas reserves, according to CEDIB, the amount of the natural resource exported via contracts with 76 private transnational companies, such as REPSOL of Spain and state-owned Petrobras of Brazil, has increased since October 2003. Furthermore, according to Lohman, during annual New Year's festivities, Mesa announced three controversial Supreme governmental decrees, one of which, numbered 27957, permits private companies occupying state-owned land to freely extract natural resources found in those tracts.

Mesa's once firm and reliable base of indigenous support—which some of his critics believe was deceived by the staging of his July 2004 gas referendum—has recently rescinded its backing for the beleaguered president, a development upon which traditional political parties waiting in the wings hope to capitalize. Across the board, each ethnic and class structure argues that Mesa's performance has been deteriorating. "Today, Mesa is viewed by some people from both the middle and popular classes as an abandoner of democracy," said Lohman. She contends that he has lost support via decisions made against the public's interest, such as raising fuel prices by 23 percent, which she states was, repetitive of his spineless neo-liberal bent and "a show of good faith to the transnational corporations and IMF."

Cancellation of Water Contract: Concession to Buy Time? Citizens of El Alto (alteños) protested with good reason against the government's contract with French conglomerate Suez Lyonnaise de Eaux. The world's second largest water corporation, the Suez group-operated Aguas de Illimani began providing water and sewage systems to El Alto and La Paz in 1997, since the beginning of this contract. Citizens of El Alto have seen the price of water increase up to 35 percent once the company took over. At $445 USD, the Suez Group's charge for each household water system installation was, when compared to the average Bolivian laborer's minimum earnings, in excess of a half year's income. Furthermore, the connection fee was tied to the U.S. dollar--Boliviano exchange rate, which on average yields a minimum annual increase of 5-7 percent. Despite the government's offer to de-dollarize charges and lower the connection fee, protests mounted and on January 13, Bolivians won a cancellation of the water contract. Without increased subsidies from abroad and sounder IMF-imposed mandates, many Bolivians in El Alto are likely to find themselves without a most fundamental resource—water.

Morales Plays Political Cards Mesa also faces recently renewed pressure from Evo Morales, MAS party leader and head of the Chaparé coca growers (cocaleros) Federation. Morales is best known abroad for his staunch anti-neoliberal views and anti-American policies which, combined with friendships with Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Cuban President Fidel Castro, have won for the fiery Aymara Indian and current leader of the coca grower's union, enemy status with the Bush administration. Washington had seen Morales and his resolute support for the right of the nation's subsistence farmers to cultivate coca (the precursor to cocaine), as a target of the U.S.'s anti-drug war and as a threat to U.S. interests in the Andean region.

Jockeying for the Presidency After remaining on the sidelines for more than two weeks as protesters successfully pushed for the cancellation of the water contract in El Alto and had filled the streets of Santa Cruz in opposition to fuel price hikes—Morales, prior to his January 16 national broadcast regarding the protests, called for Mesa to step down, albeit in guarded language. This adroit maneuver was interpreted as helping to reactivate his fading leftist image as well as seen as being an attempt to reclaim the support of his cocalero political base. It was also considered to be an effort to attract other alienated Bolivians—from whom he had largely ostracized himself due to his increasingly pro-Mesa bent in recent months. Morales is also seeking to re-cement his party's foot-hold within the nation's political structure following MAS' unexpectedly poor showing in recent municipal elections. Although Morales' MAS failed to secure seats in any of the country's ten major cities, it continues to maintain its status as congress' most cohesive party.

After rallying his cocalero supporters via a scorching condemnation of Mesa's ill-advised fuel price increase, Morales nonetheless threw his support behind Mesa on January 24, when he criticized the cruceño 'oligarchy' for its declaration of autonomy, therein reinforcing his intention to vie for the presidency in 2007, or perhaps earlier. As of now, it seems that Morales' strategy is to hedge his political future and that of MAS as well on Mesa's ability to stagger through his current term and uneventfully step aside in 2007.

While Morales is now considered an early favorite in the 2007 elections—as he finished a close second to Sánchez de Lozada in 2002 with 21 percent of the popular vote—other political players are likely to emerge. Former president Jorge Quiroga is alleged to be contemplating a run in 2007, as is La Paz mayor Juan del Granado, who was recently re-elected, despite a strong MAS presence in the capital, on his strong performance last term.

Will Morales and MAS Be Outmaneuvered? Hormando Vaca Diez, a Senator from Santa Cruz as well as serving as the president of congress, has taken to tactical maneuvers of his own. Following Sánchez de Lozada's ouster, he took on the vice-presidential responsibilities and now stands in line to succeed Mesa if the increasingly besieged president is prematurely pushed out of office. Vaca Diez—a member of the conservative Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) party, who may be seen as directly aligned with Sánchez de Lozada—has played a central role in stalling legislation that would have reformed the hydrocarbon industry and returned it to being more of a state-controlled entity. Contrary to heeding the will of his people, Vaca Diez has sided with international gas-export conglomerates and disregarded the average Bolivian. He also was greatly assisted in stalling the gas reforms by his fellow elite cruceños, who in the main see themselves as being better off if the flashy southeasterner was in office rather than Mesa.

U.S. and International Media Continue to Misconstrue Protests While the opposition toward Mesa's governing strategy remains steady, it is important to note that many U.S. and other foreign journalists continue to misrepresent the protest by grassroots sectors as being "violent" or "bloody," while the most recent ones have remained peaceful and non-violent. Sánchez de Lozada's ouster was hardly nonviolent, but the violence came from the government and its uniformed armed forces, not the public.

Commenting on the instability of Latin America in the January 17, 2005 Washington Post, columnist Jackson Diehl contended that "the Chavez-funded Movement Toward Socialism has already driven one democratically-elected president from office through violent protests." In reality, the greater majority of those 59 individuals who perished in the October 2003 demonstrations against the proposed export of Bolivian gas via Chile, were in fact civilians slain by the country's military and police. The sending in of troops and the authorizing of them to use force was mandated by the soon-to-be ousted Sánchez de Lozada. Whereas Diehl's typically inaccurate and simplistic statements portray Bolivian protesters as a violent mob, in reality the neoliberal advocate and friend of the Bush administration, Sánchez de Lozada, was ousted by a peaceful movement amid a nationwide call—including that of then Vice President Mesa (who split from the government)—in urging him to step down.

This analysis was compiled by COHA's Bolivia research team, with Patrick Quirk as lead COHA researcher.

February 11, 2005

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