16 February 1999
La Jornada
By José Gil Olmos

Three years have gone by since the San Andrés Accords on indigenous culture and rights were signed, but never implemented. This has brought about various consequences from a break-down in dialogue (30 months ago) and the disappearance of the National Intermediation Commission, to the death of at least 136 people at the hands of paramilitary groups, the displacement of 15 thousand indigenous people who fled into the mountains to save themselves from another massacre like the one at Acteal, and the obligatory departure of 300 foreigners from the country having been in the conflict zone.

The accords on indigenous culture and rights that were signed on February 16th 1996 in the municipal building of San Andrés Sacamch'en were considered at that time to be a decisive step towards signing peace in Chiapas. Instead, they have become a dead letter, and their implementation is now the principal condition for restarting the peace process.

In order to sign these first accords, the Zapatista National Liberation Army and the Federal Government negotiated for 25 months from the beginning of the rebel group's first public appearance. Having arrived at the first accords, the Federal Government thought that it was well down the road to achieving peace. In fact, the Friday that the documents were signed, there was enormous pressure on the Zapatistas to have their photographs taken to prove that peace was starting to breaking out.

The names of Commanders David, Tacho and Zebedeo appeared on four documents alongside those of the government envoys, Marco Antonio Bernal and Jorge del Valle. However, the "historic photograph" with which they hoped to sell the solidification of the peace process never took place that midday.

The event was private, even though they insisted that the 17 EZLN commanders make it public. Upon leaving the site of the dialogues to say goodbye to the hundreds of indigenous people waiting in the main square of the Tzotzil village, Commander David explained why they had not accepted having their photographs taken alongside the government representative.

"We came to a limited agreement; we didn't allow ourselves to be tricked into believing that we had signed peace. If we don't agree to sign openly and in public it's because we are right (...) They have always rewarded our struggle with betrayal. We cannot talk about peace if hundreds of soldiers are on top of our villages with their armored cars, tanks and planes. That isn't peace, it's a sign of war", he declared before demanding clear signs of distention from the government.

The situation did not change. The San Andrés Accords hardly lasted seven months and their non-implementation gave place to new stages of the conflict. The first began on September 2nd of the same year when the EZLN declared that dialogue was suspended in response to President Ernesto Zedillo's decision not to accept the COCOPA (Commission for Concord and Pacification) initiative based on the San Andrés Accords. The Executive modified the initiative in January 1997 and sent its own initiative to the Senate on March 14th 1998. With that, the Interior Minister, Francisco Labastida, argued that one of the causes of the conflict had been resolved.

The negotiations fell apart after the suspension of dialogue and the panorama of the armed conflict in Chiapas got worse, acquiring the name "low intensity war" and embarking on a spiral of violence that has brought about the deaths of at least 136 people at the hands of 10 paramilitary groups identified in the report Chiapas, "The War Underway", by the Miguel Agustín Pro Juarez Human Rights Center, published last February, and also in the research carried out by the Fray Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights Center, entitled "The Legality of Injustice."

The New Face of the Conflict

The suspension of the dialogue between the EZLN and the Federal Government on September 2nd 1996, due to the non-implementation of the San Andrés Accords, opened up conditions for violence in half of Chiapas's territory and made the government harden its policy.

The CONAI, headed by bishop Samuel Ruiz García, was dissolved following a defamation campaign against the Diocese of San Cristóbal, in which even the Federal Executive participated. This period also saw the departure of 300 foreigners from the country who had been in the conflict zone; 87 were supposedly expelled for interfering in national politics, and the government presented its new strategy for Chiapas, in which it reduced the conflict to only four municipalities.

Upon his resignation from the CONAI, Samuel Ruiz summarized the attacks against the Diocese of San Cristóbal: "Expulsion of seven priests under false accusations; refusal of residency to foreign pastoral workers; the imprisonment of four priests under false charges and in clear violation of their human rights; the closure of some 40 churches (some occupied by the army); arrest warrants for numerous priests, nuns and missionaries; pressure on various peasants to testify that the diocese delivers arms to the communities; directives to various communications media to distort the news; creation of a lynching climate; profanation of the holy sacrament in various churches by the security police."

The massacre of 45 indigenous people at Acteal by paramilitary groups from Chenalhó on December 22nd 1997, was a faithful reflection of this violent situation, as was the displacement of 15 thousand indigenous people in the Highlands and North of Chiapas, according to non-governmental organizations, or seven thousand according to official figures.

The lack of mediation had immediate effects in 25 municipalities where there are indigenous communities that sympathize with the EZLN: the paramilitary groups carried out murders, kidnappings and illegal detentions; they injured and threatened all those who rejected official aid or expressed sympathy for the rebel group.

In this way, while the CONAI and COCOPA made efforts to restart the dialogue, paramilitary groups began intimidation activities in half of Chiapas that human rights organizations have called "low intensity war."

According to the report by the Miguel Agustín Pro Human Rights Center, these groups started to operate in 1993, but intensified their activities in 1996 in the municipalities of Chenalhó, Larráinzar, Chamula, Pantelhó, Yajalón, Ocosingo, Venustiano Carranza, Tila, Sabanilla, Tumbalá, Salta de Agua, Palenque, Las Margaritas, Oxchuc, Huixtán, Altamirano, Sitalá, San Juan Cancuc, Simojovel, Huitiupan, El Bosque, Frontera Comolapa, y Pueblo Nuevo Solistahuacán.

The principal armed groups formed a new police-military geography in Chiapas, integrating themselves with the military positions taken in February 1995, when the troops invaded the Lacondón Jungle, Highlands and Northern Zone, in search of the leaders.

Various reports agree that the main active paramilitary groups are: Los Chinchulines; Máscara Roja; Primera Fuerza; Alianza San Bartolomé; Fuerzas Armadas del Pueblo; Paz y Justicia; Movimiento Indígena Revolucionario Antizapatista; Degolladores and Thomas Munzer. Four more unnamed groups have been detected.

The massacre at Acteal on December 22nd 1997 not only uncovered the new face of the Chiapas conflict, it also allowed the Mexican Army to take up new positions and to spread itself even more than in December 1994 in response to the widening of the EZLN area of influence to 38 "rebel municipalities", and in February 1995 with the operation Task Force Arco Iris, in which they sought to catch and apprehend the rebel leadership in the Canyons region of the Lacondón Jungle.

With claims of applying the Fire Arms and Explosives Law, the army installed more check points, restarted the incursions into Zapatista communities and re-continued the air and ground surveillance patrols that they had suspended.

Unofficial reports indicate that there are 40 thousand soldiers in the Chiapas conflict zone. Before the massacre at Acteal, the troops were concentrated in San Cristóbal de las Casas, Comitan, Altamirano, Ocosingo, Las Margaritas, Larrainzar, Palenque, and Sabanilla. Afterwards, they spread to El Bosque, Chenalhó, Pantelhó, Simojovel, Huitiupan, Bachajon, Mitontic, Sitala, Nuevo Solisstahuacan, Socoltenango, Tecpatan, Jitotol and Ostuacan. In other words, almost half of Chiapas.