?El PPP es mil veces más que el zapatismo o una comunidad indígena en Chiapas.? -- President Vicente Fox Quesada, México

I. Introduction

Unsustainable extraction of natural resources, slash-and-burn agriculture, and ranching are leading to the rapid demise of rainforests. Although restoration ecology and conservation initiatives must begin immediately, they can never succeed without addressing the lack of economic alternatives and basic human services like healthcare and education. The poverty and instability in the lives of inhabitants of the Maya Forest make it almost impossible to address environmental concerns; previous efforts have shown that attempts to ?relocate? these communities will simply lead to destruction of another section of the Maya Forest, with local resistance and military repression destroying human lives in the process. Moreover, frontier expansion into forests is not driven by the potential profits from timber or agriculture, but rather by the growing population that is excluded from other economic opportunities. It is not that these areas are attracting people, but rather that the Maya Forest acts as a holding area for those who have nowhere else to go. In order for any ecological conservation plan to succeed in the midst of such overwhelming poverty, it must work with communities to find ways to live sustainably without destroying the Maya Forest.

The need for ecological conservation must be balanced with the pressing need for economic development in the Maya Forest. Likewise, measures for economic development must respect and value precious ecosystems in order to have a lasting positive impact. Not only is this in the best interest of Maya Forest for environmental reasons, but also for economic reasons. The historical trend of underdeveloped countries selling their natural resources for a pittance has proved to be unprofitable; ?though natural resource extraction has generated foreign exchange and government revenue, it has often failed to translate into long-term economic success for resource-dependent countries? countries rich in natural resources have on average performed worse economically than resource-poor countries in recent decades.? The reasons for this disturbing trend are two-fold: first, the international market systematically undervalues natural resources such that individual nations are effectively taking a loss when they trade resources for dollars; second, traditional methods of natural resource extraction are not sustainable, meaning that a country will develop a dependence on a natural resource that will run out and leave it unprepared to cope in the international market.

The solution to successfully integrating the needs of ecological conservation and economic development is sustainable development. The 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development defined sustainable development as ?development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.? The goal of sustainable development is to integrate environmental, economic and human development factors such that all three can improve without doing so at the expense of another.

In recent years, sustainable development has grown from a nebulous concept to a benchmark for development. Greater possibility exists for integration now than ever before because the international community is beginning to change standards in the market based on the premise that we have historically undervalued our natural resources. In recognition that conservation offers environmental services on a global level, international forums such as the United Nations have created economic incentives for ecological conservation, allowing developing countries to see greater benefit from sustainable development.

In México and Central America, the concurrence of an ecological conservation plan and an economic development plan creates a unique opportunity for sustainable development. Both plans purport to incorporate sustainable development into their primary goal: the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano (CBM) added an opportunity for human economic development in those regions where it would not interfere with pristine habitats, and the Plan Puebla-Panamá (PPP) added the objective of sustainable development to its traditional economic development models. Although neither plan has the specific, primary goal of sustainable development, the framework of both plans allows for sustainable development. These plans are not currently meeting that potential, but they can.

The Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano is one of the first innovative ecological conservation plans that seek to work across national borders, creating terrestrial corridors to connect natural habitats for increased preservation of endangered species. The Corredor is an attempt to divide all of Central America, from southern México down through Panamá, into planned zones that will designate varying levels of permitted human use. Innovative and ambitious, the corridor plan takes land use planning to a level never implemented before.

The Plan Puebla-Panamá is a new economic development plan for nine southern Mexican states (Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz and Yucatán) and the countries of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panamá. As it was originally promulgated by President Vicente Fox, the Plan focuses primarily on development in México; as such, it will be addressed as a Mexican state attempt to rehabilitate earlier economic plans. The Plan Puebla-Panamá purports to encompass and simultaneously address three interconnected aspects of Mesoamerican life: economic growth and its equitable distribution, sustainable management of its natural resources, and human development. According to Alfonso Romo, who stands to make an outstanding profit from his agro-biotechnology company Grupo Pulsar, the Plan Puebla-Panamá will ?asegurar que los frutos de la globalización lleguen a todos los rincones de México.?

Given the striking emphasis of the Plan Puebla-Panamá on south-southeastern México, I have chosen to focus on this region in my analysis of the intersection of the CBM and the PPP. Although the Plan encompasses nine southern states in México, the Corredor addresses only five, the states of Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Yucatán. This paper will deal primarily with the intersection of the two plans in these five southern states, although there are serious environmental and economic issues in the other four states as well.

II. Communities of South-Southeastern México

The undisputed historical ?underdevelopment? of south/southeastern México is precisely what makes it a prime candidate for both ecological conservation and economic development using human capital. Although the root causes are myriad and complex, the basic effects are undisputed. The ?underdevelopment? of the land means both greater preservation of the Great Barrier Reef in the seas and preservation of terrestrial ecological systems amidst the rapidly disappearing tropical forests throughout the world. The ?underdevelopment? of the people of this region, often referred to by the Plan Puebla-Panamá as human capital, means that the people in southern México live in poverty, supporting themselves with subsistence agriculture (or agriculture in a latifundist system) without access to basic healthcare and education.

The virtual abandonment by federal powers not only created a space for intense domination by local elites, but also signified a space of freedom for other persecuted peoples in other regions. As such, south/southeastern México has become home to migrating communities fleeing poverty and repression in México and Guatemala, as well as remnants of revolutionary groups such as the Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional (FLN). While each of the five states encompassed in the development plans has its own unique history, I will attempt here to offer a brief overview of the history of peoples and lands in the region as a whole.

The geographical region of southern México became what it is today in 1812, when the Chiapas region left Guatemala to join a weak Mexican state, allowing the local elites relative autonomy and marking the beginning of their internal struggle to control land and labor amongst themselves. By this time, the distribution of power had been well established under the Spanish colonial system: the Spanish government gave Creole settlers encomiendas; in exchange for the encomendero?s ?protection? and Catholic religious education, the indigenous peoples had to pay the encomendero a tribute, in either goods or labor. Although the passage of time brought independence to the nation of México, the dynamic of power in southern México did not change. The mestizo elites, who self-identified as ladino, became caciques in a latifundist system. In this system, many indigenous peoples, who formerly had greater control of the land, became migrant workers.

The advent of the Mexican Revolution in 1910 offered a glimpse of hope to those indigenous stakeholders who wanted the right to own and reap the benefits of the land they lived on. Many caciques joined in the Revolution and usually encouraged campesinos to fight on their behalf, but most of them chose to fight under peasant revolutionary heroes like Emilio Zapata. Although Zapata?s success was built upon the foundation of agrarian land reform, Zapatismo quickly came to encompass individual liberties, national and state government reform, and labor relations. Zapatismo?s solution to the agrarian problem was to give back the land to communities that had owned them and grant those communities political autonomy, allowing them to use the land according to tradition. The revolutionary aspect of Zapatismo has become a myth that campesinos hearken back to in times of trial.

The 1917 Mexican Constitution included a more limited form of agrarian reform in Article 27, which endows the state with inalienable ownership of the country?s land, waters and subsoil resources and recognized indigenous villages as corporate bodies entitled to land tenure as ejidos. Article 27 has been a source of conflict between indigenous communities and larger landholders in México; it became a source of international contention when the Mexican government significantly weakened it in order to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Land reform in the early twentieth century under Article 27 did not occur equally throughout México: in much of Quintana Roo, each ejidatario was allotted 420 hectares by the 1940?s; in other areas, large landowners continued to consolidate their holdings, decreasing the prospects for land tenure for local communities as the years passed. Beginning in the 1940?s, landless neighbors, often peons on the same finca, grouped together to win ejidos that became the basis for new communities. Their successes proved to be the exception rather than the rule. The vast majority of the land became increasingly devoted to cattle ranching as roads were built through the region.

In the 1950?s and 1960?s, a younger generation of peasants, frustrated by local politics and their inability to secure land tenure in the rising tide of cattle ranches, migrated east, until there were almost 100,000 of them in the area currently designated the Lancandón forest today. Many of these early campesino settlements mimicked the slash-and-burn agricultural model, rather than the more sustainable example of those native to the Lancandón forest, which involves thinning the forest?s canopy and creating small gardens of tropical vegetables, fruits, fibers and spices. By 1970, 60% of the Lancandón had been cleared using the slash-and-burn method, transforming vast expanses of forest into new communities. Many of these communities were later criticized for destroying the forest in national forums. Unfortunately, environmentalists failed to acknowledge the political turmoil and extreme poverty that forced these impromptu communities to seek new lands as a means of survival.

In what has become known as ?El Conflicto por la Brecha,? the Mexican government made the area in question a new economic development zone, which the new communities resisted. In 1972, President Luís Echevarría decreed that 2,400 square miles in Chiapas belonged to the ?Lancandón tribe,? consisting of about 66 families living from rainforest garden farming. The federal government stood to make a hefty profit from this designation, as it would manage the land, cutting 10,000 mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) and cedar (Cedrela oderata) trees from the Lancandón per year. The designation clearly offered legitimacy to the historic occupiers of the land, the ?Lancandón tribe,? while refusing to acknowledge claims of the campesino settlements in the area. Those 4,000 families were to be forced into resettlement camps along the Usumacinta River. Twenty of the thirty-seven communities refused to leave their homes for the resettlement camps, however, and violent conflict broke out between the campesinos and the Mexican military. Echevarría?s creation of a conservation/development zone in an area populated with ejidos and their violent resistance foreshadowed the problems to come in Salinas? amendment to Article 27 to create a market-based communal land system.

Around the same time as the unresolved conflicts in the Lancandón forest escalated, the Mexican government also devised and implemented a new economic development scheme for southern México. A small stretch of beach in an unincorporated part of México became Cancún, a beach resort for tourists from around the world. Cancún has brought innumerable tourists and their dollars to Quintana Roo, a state that was not created until Cancún?s advent, but tourism is now taking its toll on the barrier reefs, receding beaches and natural habitats that are being developed into resorts.

In the 1980?s, approximately $100 million was allocated for a program of ?agrarian rehabilitation? that sped up the process of granting ejidos, effectively resulting in an even more concentrated land ownership in a brief period of time. For example, in Ocosingo, 206 ejidos held fully 97.5% of the township?s surface. Those people who saw their chance to own the land they occupied slipping away became increasingly desperate as economic depression set in. President Salinas? 1992 reform of Article 27 ended 75 years of land reform and quashed lingering hopes landless campesinos had of achieving land tenure. Under Salinas? reform, forest ejidos can enter into joint ventures or offer concessions to private timber companies, but cannot sell these lands. Agricultural ejidos, on the other hand, may be parceled and used as collateral for bank loans or sold. Commercial operations, which were previously prohibited from owning agricultural lands, may now purchase these lands. Beyond the problematic issue of the Mexican government changing its constitution in order to enter into an international trade agreement, the differentiation between ejidal rights with regard to forest and agricultural ejidos may encourage ejidatarios to clear and parcel forest land in order to reserve the right to sell it later.

It was during this time of frustration and despair that the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) took root in southern México. An outgrowth of the FLN, the EZLN made itself known internationally when it declared war on the Mexican government on the first day the NAFTA trade agreement came into effect, January 1, 1994. The EZLN offensive was a complete failure in military terms, with 51 soldiers/state police dead, at least 70 Zapatistas dead, and anywhere from 19 to 75 civilians dead by the time the EZLN retreated on January 12th, 1994. Politically, however, the offensive was a tremendous success: the EZLN had succeeded in placing the problems of southeastern México in the international public sphere.

The EZLN, especially through its charismatic spokesman, Subcomandante Marcos, spent the next two years holding international meetings and resisting repression by the Mexican government. Ironically, the cycle of violent repression and resistance backfired for the Mexican government, keeping the plight of the Zapatistas in the public eye and contributing to the crisis of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which had been in power for seventy years.

In February 1996, Zedillo?s government and the EZLN signed the San Andrés Accords, outlining a program of land reform, indigenous and cultural rights. Zedillo?s good faith efforts went awry, however, as over the next year paramilitary groups slaughtered praying peasants in the Acteal Massacre and the federal army dismantled autonomous Zapatista communities by force. The international community was outraged, and in June 1998, Bishop Samuel García ended his attempts to mediate a peace, accusing the government of preferring to slaughter peasants instead of seeking peace.

In 2000, Vicente Fox was elected president, ending the PRI dynasty. One of Fox?s campaign promises that helped him get elected was to resolve the problems in Chiapas immediately. In February, the EZLN embarked on a ?Zapatour? through rural México to the capital to rally support for the Cocopa law, which was to implement the resolutions of the San Andrés Accords. The EZLN later condemned the Cocopa law, which was so weakened by the time it passed into law that the Zapatistas declared it unacceptable.

Subcomandante Marcos learned of Fox?s Plan Puebla-Panamá, including the transportation initiatives for a dry canal in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, while on the ?Zapatour.? On a stop in La Ventosa on February 25, 2002, Marcos declared to background of cheers, ?¡El Istmo no se vende!? In the span of a few short days, the federal government and rural southern communities destroyed their tenuous reconciliation and became enemies once more.

III. Conservation and the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano (CBM)

South/southeastern México is host to a wide variety of species in a series of complex ecosystems that comprise the Mesoamerican Hot Spot, extending down from México through Panamá. Conservation biologists have labeled this region a Hot Spot because it contains a disproportionately high diversity of genetic material for such a small surface area: although the region comprises only .5% of the world?s land surface, it is host to approximately 7-8% of all the different types of organisms in the world. Not only is this region host to a proportionally high level of biodiversity vital for conservation and sustainability of the world?s species, but it is also in grave danger. México ranks 73rd out of 122 world nations in terms of environmental sustainability, with the states of Hidalgo, Chiapas, Morelos, Veracruz and Zacatecas in the greatest danger.

Patterns of development in this region of the Americas are such that ?as forests are converted to farmlands or wetlands to industrial estates, the previously contiguous areas of natural habitat become fragmented into smaller patches whose number increases as their total area diminishes.? This pattern of habitat fragmentation effectively turns the patches of original habitat into ?islands,? separated from other patches that just a few years before had been connected. Prominent biologists such as E. O. Wilson have shown that habitat fragmentation accelerates the pace of extinction for species in those habitats, especially larger vertebrate animals that need greater land area to survive.

Although the need for conservation efforts in the Mesoamerican Hot Spot has long been internationally acknowledged, poverty and political turmoil prevented Central American countries from working cooperatively. When a series of peace processes were negotiated in the early 1990?s, a space was opened to address the alarming rate of extinction and habitat loss across national borders. Regional legal and institutional frameworks were created to address these problems, such as the Comisión Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo (CCAD), which was created in 1989. The Mexican government did not join CCAD until 1996, and it now participates in this forum as an observer.

These frameworks were used in the predecessor to the CBM, the Paseo Pantera, spearheaded by a consortium of international nonprofit organizations to address the problems of conservation and habitat fragmentation by creating corridors to connect remaining areas of original habitat, maximizing the potential for conservation. The Paseo Pantera originally received funding from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) as a strict biodiversity conservation project.

As the geographical vision for the project extended to encompass the land from southern México down to Panamá, the goal of the plan transformed from ecological conservation to a land-use management system that would simultaneously protect key biodiversity habitats and promote sustainable social and economic development, renamed the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have allocated $5,420 million for the CBM throughout the area; all of the major funding allocated to southern México is from the World Bank. Land is divided into zones based on approved human use levels, ranging from ?re-wilded? land that necessitates relocation of all current human inhabitants to ecotourism. The four zone types approved under the CBM are: Core Zones, Buffer Zones, Corridor Zones, and Multiple-Use Zones.

Core Zones are areas designated as protected areas for local fauna and flora, usually because the area has historically been well preserved or made part of a national park. Currently protected areas in the states of Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Yucatán comprise 8.3% of the Mexico?s national territory; notable protected areas include the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve, the Sian Ka?an Biosphere Reserve, and the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve. Other areas that should be made into Core Zones under the CBM include the headwaters of rivers that act as a vital source of water and hydroelectric projects, wetlands critical for providing nutrients to soil, and estuaries that support fisheries. It is important to note that many of the areas that have already been designated biospheres or Core Zones are considered farmland in reserve by the ejidos who have land rights in them. For example, almost 52% of the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve is also private property or established ejido land. Regulating the types of activity that can occur on these lands, such as farming and hunting, is a significant source of potential conflict.

Core Zones would also be the primary sites for bioprospecting, referred to as biopiracy by local communities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that vehemently oppose it. Bioprospecting is when a pharmaceutical company or researcher investigates the potential of tropical plants for medicinal purposes. A significant amount of research has been conducted by studying how indigenous peoples use the plants, then patenting the plants for medicinal properties, which indigenous communities decry as violating their intellectual rights. While the issue of bioprospecting is as yet unresolved, Core Zones would in any event support a minimum of human activity in terms of land use.

Buffer Zones surround Core Zones and act as membranes, filtering out negative impacts moving into and out of these areas. The zone should function as a membrane for both the human and wild populations, buffering the potential damage of wild animals on crops concurrently with buffering protected species from the drift of aerial pesticides. Whereas Buffer Zones will not allow land clearing or chemical pesticides, they provide a space for human development as sites for environmental education, including ecotourism lodges and visitor facilities.

Corridor Zones link Core Zones together and will either be protected areas under government control or private land that falls under strict regulations for human land use. One of the most important corridors to southern México is the proposed corridor that will link the Sierra de Lancandón to the Laguna del Tigre National Parks in Petén, Guatemala.

The regional network of corridors will protect large areas of forest that could sequester atmospheric carbon. Carbon sequestration in terrestrial ecosystems is either the net removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere or the prevention of carbon dioxide emissions from the terrestrial ecosystems into the atmosphere. This process has become defined as a service that can be effectively sold under the auspices of the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, where a country that uses less than its allotted quota for carbon dioxide emissions can sell its unused allotment to another country. Private energy companies will also fund carbon sequestration projects, such as the collaborative funding of Belize?s Rio Bravo Conservation and Management Area, and the World Bank has offered debt forgiveness in return for carbon sequestration.

The use of corridors to connect ?islands? of habitat is the focal point of the ecological conservation aspect of the plan, preserving more wild species by expanding the land mass they have to live on. The need for corridors to connect these habitat ?islands? has been created by human development surrounding Core Zones; in order to ?re-wild? potential corridors, the people living on the land must either radically change their lifestyles or relocate. It is this hurdle, intrinsic to a corridor project, that has slowed the implementation of corridor projects in North America collectively referred to as The Wildlands Project. Although both ranchers in Colorado and campesinos in Chiapas may be resistant to changing their lifestyles, problems of land tenure give residents in México less leverage with which to negotiate. Even though the concept of ?re-wilding? seems innocuous enough at the outset, it is undoubtedly the most problematic point of the CBM.

As the central goal of the Corridor Zones is to mimic wild nature as closely as possible, agricultural practices will need to be modified to allow for a wide variety of crops, using only organic pesticides/herbicides and restricting activity when certain species are nesting or migrating through corridors. Urban areas and human transportation networks will have to be held to a minimum in order to allow for greater freedom of movement for animal species. For landless migrants and indigenous peoples whose land ownership is not clearly defined, the CBM sounds like the door slamming shut on the prospect of claiming land and controlling one?s own destiny. While formalizing land rights of long-term inhabitants of southern México remains a possibility, the government may be tempted to opt for private ventures in butterfly farms, ecotourism or medicinal plant crops. Many have suggested that residents of Core and Corridor Zones ?can be offered the option of relocating to other sites in return for immediate and adequate compensation.?

While no major relocation plan has been instituted thus far, news reports and military buildups in the area lead residents of southern México to believe that they will be forcibly removed and relocated to urban areas that will make the preservation of traditional cultures and ways of life impossible. In a best case scenario, those people relocated would move to nearby Multiple-Use Zones and act as stewards in natural resource management.

Multiple-Use Zones are those areas contained in the CBM that are used primarily for human use, based on precedent, but will become increasingly hospitable for wild species. As denoted by its name, the Multiple-Use Zone is a space for some of the most exciting human development while minimizing disruption to wild ecosystems. Biodiversity management in these areas will allow for patches of croplands, forests and wetlands, fishing areas and tourist facilities in coastal areas.

Although some changes in agricultural practices will need to be made in Multiple-Use Zones, in many cases those changes could be more of a restoration of traditional practices by historic inhabitants from the more recent practice of monoculture. Sustainable agroforestry could include layered tree cropping, with timber trees growing over fruit trees, shade coffee, and vegetables. Non-timber products, such as xate, wildberries and allspice, can also be harvested in the Maya Forest. Sustainable farming draws upon traditional techniques using simple methods that are the least damaging to the environment.

One of the most successful models for sustainable farming in the area is the decentralized Campesino a Campesino (CAC) movement, which probably began when the Kaqchikel Mayas were forced to flee political turmoil in Guatemala and practiced the sustainable farming techniques they had developed everywhere they settled down. In southern México, this movement spread to Chiapas and was supported by twenty different NGOs that originally focused on the cultivation of organic, shade-grown coffee. In order to facilitate further development of sustainable agriculture in southern México, the federal government will need to transition benefits and subsidies over to products such as shade-grown coffee and cacao. In addition, NGOs can facilitate this effort by providing seed funding for farms and dissemination of information; for example, the Unión de Ejidos San Fernando was able to discern the best conditions for organic shade-grown coffee in Chiapas state and disseminate that information through a grant from the Ford Foundation.

The Mexican government can enter into mutually beneficial arrangements with indigenous and campesino groups that allow local communities greater control over their land and reduce the need for costly direct field management by the state. These local groups could direct efforts in bioprospecting, reforestation, road maintenance and collection of taxonomic data.

IV. Economic Development and the Plan Puebla-Panamá (PPP)

Programs for sustainable development and market-based industrial development are relatively new for México. Until its debt crisis in the early 1980?s, Mexican economic policy sought to raise agricultural production through price controls and subsidies and relieve poverty by redistributing land. These policies typically encouraged clearing large plots of forest to establish farms for land tenure.

After the debt crisis, México moved towards an international market-based economy. In 1986, México entered into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). To ease the nation into the international market, the Mexican government embarked on short-term plans for food assistance and support for farmers. The food assistance company, Compañia Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO), implemented price supports for basic food staples until 1999. Although the Mexican government maintains subsidies for impoverished and rural areas to pay for food staples such as tortillas, the price of tortillas has risen 41% since the closure of CONASUPO. The main support program for farmers is the Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo (PROCAMPO), which has been integrated into the technical assistance program, Alianza Para el Campo. PROCAMPO, established in 1993, is a fifteen-year program that offers direct payments to Mexico?s 3.5 million farmers who produce basic commodities as a means of providing transitional support in response to international market conditions. These programs reflect the shift in Mexican economic policy from self-sufficiency to an international trade-based economy.

The Plan Puebla-Panamá was originally promulgated by Vicente Fox as a way to facilitate trade to create an economic relationship modeled after that of México, the United States and Canada following the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Central American heads of state immediately endorsed the Plan. The Plan derives a significant portion of its funding from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Spanish government, with expected contributions from the Mexican government, other participating federal governments, and the private sector.

As originally explicated, the Plan has eight objectives for development in Mesoamerica: elevate the level of human and social development of the population; achieve greater participation of civil society in development; achieve a structural change in the economic dynamic: transportation infrastructure, hydroelectric energy, telecommunications, and facilitate investment; develop vocations with comparative geographic advantages in mind, such as cheap labor and abundant natural resources; establish a modern political framework that attracts foreign investment, including guaranteed access to credit and subsidies for agriculture, manufacturing and tourism; achieve sustainable management of natural resources; promote joint strategies and conjunctive development plans between the South-Southeastern region of México and Central America; and modernize and strengthen the capacities of local institutions in the region.

When comparing the eight objectives with the eight funded initiatives announced this March, the funding will undoubtedly serve to attain some objectives more than others. Whereas no funding has been allocated to facilitate greater participation of civil society in development or to strengthen local institutions that could have assisted in this effort, more than 95% of the budget is devoted to creating a new economic infrastructure. Total funding for the eight priority initiatives is $4,017.7 million, with 44.2% of the total budget going to México. Funding for the eight initiatives has been allocated as follows:

Initiative	Funding
Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Disasters	$27,000,000
Sustainable Development	$16,500,000
Human Development	$31,500,000
Tourism	$51,700,000
Trade Facilitation	$23,500,000
Telecommunications	$1,200,000
Energy Interconnection	$445,700,000
Transportation Infrastructure	$3,420,600,000

Projects outlined thus far for prevention and mitigation of natural disasters include improvement of the region?s hydro-meteorological systems and development of a market for catastrophe insurance. Munich Re, a company that insures insurance companies, estimates that economic losses from large-scale natural catastrophes have increased eightfold since the 1960?s, with $536 billion in economic losses due to natural catastrophes in the 1990?s. Catastrophe insurance is quickly becoming unprofitable, as coastal homeowners in areas plagued with hurricanes who cannot obtain insurance have already discovered. Expansion of the Plan should seek to mitigate the potential effects of recurring hazards with those populations who are the most vulnerable, impoverished communities with inadequate housing. While foreknowledge of impending disasters is essential for evacuation and insurance for recuperating losses is essential for rebuilding, these projects seek to mitigate problems that are symptomatic of natural disasters rather than prevent the disasters themselves.

Mitigation is not natural disaster prevention. Although early warnings and improved housing can prevent catastrophic loss of life, the natural disasters themselves can be prevented. The occurrence of natural disasters in Central America is rapidly accelerating, most notably occurrences of storms and floods, and the root causes of these disasters are worldwide problems, such as global warming and rising sea levels. Natural disaster prevention on a global level is not possible within the framework of the Plan, but México should be cognizant of the effects of its participation in international programs such as Agenda 21 and the Kyoto Protocol in disaster prevention. On a national and regional level, the Plan should explicitly recognize the effectiveness of forests in climate regulation, flood control, soil conservation, and water cycling and contribute to their conservation and reforestation as a natural disaster prevention measure.

The funding as outlined specifically allocates $16.5 million for ?sustainable development,? which remains a nebulous, undefined aspect of the plan rather than a guiding principle that must be applied to all aspects of the Plan. As such, it remains unclear what specific activities these monies will fund, although the objectives of the Plan provide some clues. The official Plan?s statement of objectives poses the activities of indigent rural communities as practicing environmentally destructive activities in opposition to the potential for fisheries, oil exploitation and large-scale agriculture. While some of the small-scale slash-and-burn farming techniques on relatively new settlements have undoubtedly damaged the ecosystems, offering technical assistance and government subsidies for sustainable agriculture will cause less environmental harm than oil exploitation or fishery expansion.

Another concept outlined in the Plan?s official objectives is to create a network of rural centers that ?asumirían el rol de espacios de atracción y de dispersión poblacional; así, se constituirán también en factores de desarrollo productivo y sustentable de la región, propiciando una mayor integración comercial.? The creation of a network of rural centers seems to be a centralization of funding and labor, eventually fomenting relocation into more urbanized areas of indigenous communities near major transportation routes. The fundamental restructuring of these communities is not for their benefit, but rather an attempt to emulate earlier development plans that facilitate access to markets through forced relocation. ?The PPP?s success depends upon indigenous Mexicans? willingness to leave their rural villages? in order to enter into an international labor market that refuses to pay a living wage for working in substandard, often hazardous, conditions. This is not necessarily more sustainable than if communities were to modify agricultural techniques, and it poses grave social and human rights issues for the communities in question.

Greater funding has been allocated for ?human development,? which will improve the lives of affected communities. Based on the objectives, the funding for human development will be devoted to improving education, increasing access to healthcare, improving sanitation and housing conditions, and strengthening respect for indigenous communities and their cultural traditions. The funding allocated for human development in the Plan, however, is woefully inadequate. Given population estimates for the nine southern states of 21,296,769 people in 2000, if all the Plan funding for human development were devoted to México, it would spend $1.48 per person. If human development funding matches Plan average distribution by country, then only 44.2% of the money will go to México, leaving only 65 cents per person for sanitation, healthcare, and education.

$51.7 million has been allocated for the development of tourism, both ecotourism and cultural tourism. Ecotourism intends to capitalize on the biodiversity of the region?s tropical forest. Cultural tourism intends to capitalize on the unique cultural heritage of the region, through renovation and use of Mayan ruins as tourist sites as well as cultural exchange tours to traditional Mayan villages. Plan administrators have not yet specified how they intend to encourage tourism.

Another initiative specifically directed towards economic development is trade facilitation between regions and nations. An often-cited barrier to both trade and private investment is unclear or inconsistent regulations; part of this initiative seeks to streamline regulations and create a transparent regulatory framework to maximize profit potential. Processes for this streamlining are not clearly defined, but the Plan?s objectives envision ?desregulación federal, estatal y municipal entre otros para: la homologación de la legislación estatal del medio ambiente con el nuevo marco jurídico federal aplicable en la materia.? If the streamlined regulations maintain provisions for environmental and microenterprise protections, the regulations will help achieve a fair and equitable market. If regulations eliminate some of the regulatory protections and subsidies, however, ecosystems and indigenous communities throughout Mesoamerica will suffer the consequences.

Increasing economic infrastructure through telecommunications, energy interconnection and transportation integration comprises the remainder of current Plan funding, accounting for $3,867.5 million of the total $4,017.7 million. The Plan?s framers insist that the infrastructure must first be in place for further development to be successful. In the telecommunications arena, plans are underway for the development of a regional fiber optic network. The energy initiative primarily provides funding for the Sistema de Interconexión Eléctrica para los Países de America Central (SIEPAC). Hydroelectric plans in México are also being implemented, notably for Palota and Chicoasén II. A whopping 85.2% of the total budget is for transportation integration through the strengthening of railways, roads, airports and sea routes.

Priority transportation projects include the air terminal in Terán, Tuxtla Gutierrez; Gulf, Pacific and Transisthmus Corridors; railways in southeastern México, Chiapas Mayab and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec; and ports in Coatzacoalcos, Salina Cruz, Dos Bocas and Puerto Madero. Much of these priority projects is actually a relaunching of a project to modernize the controversial Trans-Isthmus Railroad, which crosses the Isthmus of Tehuantepec from Salina Cruz, Oaxaca, on the Pacific Coast to Coatzacoalecos, Veracruz on the coast of the Gulf of México. The National Railroad of Tehuantepec was first constructed at the beginning of the 20th century with British capital; in response to the loss of 80 hectares of land, Nahua and Popoluca communities rose up in arms against the railroad in 1906.

The region has been under contention ever since. President Luís Echevarría included the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in another development plan, which accelerated the fight for control of the region and its natural resources well into the 1970?s. An unintended result of the struggle has been mobilization of student and indigenous groups who brought the struggle of the Zapotec communities into national awareness. A later successor, President Zedillo, expanded Echevarría?s vision into the Trans-Isthmus MegaProject, featuring a freight terminal that would take fourteen days? travel time off shipping from the Panamá Canal (which can take up to three weeks to cross), eucalyptus and African palm tree plantations, salt mining, shrimping projects, and a new maquila corridor. Critics of the Plan Puebla-Panamá assert that the bulk of the Plan is simply a rehashed version of Zedillo?s Mega Project.

Some of the transportation improvements under the PPP are already underway and building roads through ejidal lands. In the indigenous community of Simon Sarlat, eight families learned after their land had been expropriated that a 1956 presidential act made it legal for the Mexican government to widen a highway by up to 30 meters without any obligation to compensate the ejidos on which the highway would be built. When the Secretary of Communications and Transport decided to expand the Villahermosa-Frontera highway, however, it was legally required to issue an expropriation decree, which it failed to do. Six of the eight families fought back against threats of jail (for blocking the highway) on this basis. The planned highway expansion will run directly through Pantana de Centla Biosphere Reserve.

This case exemplifies the problems inherent in creating transportation and economic infrastructure before implementing measures to ensure community participation and ecological conservation. An important part of civil society participation is regional meetings, with all stakeholders present, to define objectives and goals for development. Within a forum of community participation, principles for ecological conservation and economic development must be articulated and agreed upon before measures can be implemented. Although Plan administrators assert the necessity of building infrastructure first to lay the groundwork for economic development, building infrastructure is also development that must be subjected to rigorous standards of participation by all stakeholders and consistency with the Plan?s specified objectives.

In the Plan Puebla-Panamá?s current vision, major economic development initiatives will follow the improvement of regulatory and transportation infrastructure. Economic development initiatives of the Plan will include: agriculture; fisheries; maquilas devoted to clothes, furniture, electronics and auto parts; mining, especially of non-metallic resources such as salt mining in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec; petrochemical development; bioprospecting and tourism. The rationale behind improving infrastructure before economic development is that many industries, such as maquilas and tourism, need improved infrastructure to become more attractive to private investment. According to the Plan, ?para que los flujos de capital externos e internos sean captados por la región Sur-Sureste del país y se convierten en un instrumento de soporte para el desarrollo, se buscará que existan condiciones de seguridad, estabilidad y certidumbre jurídica para la inversión productiva nacional y extranjera en la región.?

With this rationale in place, streamlining trade and commerce regulations, creation energy interconnection, and improving telecommunications infrastructure provide the framework on which economic development will be built. This rationale becomes problematic when reconciled with the objectives of empowering local communities and encouraging small business. By expending the bulk of Plan funding on encouraging private investment, often from foreign corporations, the Plan ensures that those who stand to profit the most from southern Mexico?s development are not the communities of southern México, but foreign-based corporations. Implementation of the Plan thus far is following the historical pattern of encouraging development through increasing infrastructure and ?stability,? often through increased military presence in areas targeted for investment to make them ?secure? for foreign investment. To the extent that ?security? created through militarization of communities is integrated into economic development plans, community autonomy and development are doomed to fail.

Once these conditions of security, stability and juridical certainty exist in southern México, the Plan proposes offering financial incentives for investment. One encouraging sign is that the objectives state that the federal government will financially support or subsidize those businesses that are specifically developed by indigenous peoples. The vast majority of financial incentives, however, will seek to move companies to southern México by constructing large industrial parks with services and transportation, subsidizing businesses that are new to the area, and guaranteeing access to loans with reduced interest rates.

Thus far, funded initiatives of the Plan Puebla-Panamá lack vital aspects of the Plan?s original objectives. The current focus of the Plan?s energies is attracting investment from the private sector, transforming the role of local and indigenous communities in economic development from stakeholders to human capital, a source of cheap labor to work in foreign-owned maquilas. If the Plan continues on its current trajectory, this will be the fate of affected communities.

V. Pitfalls and Potential in Integration of the Plan Puebla-Panamá and the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano

As a nation with a highly developed infrastructure and economic base, México has the capacity to facilitate development in regions of severe poverty, lacking in basic human services and economic opportunities. The government is also in a position to simultaneously develop means for ecological conservation in southern México, which is the fourth most biodiverse region in the world. The massive influx of funding and international cooperation places México at the forefront of sustainable development with the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano and the Plan Puebla-Panamá. If México fails to seize this opportunity to fully integrate the needs for ecological conservation and economic development, it will be only in favor of those transnational corporations that invest in the region. Poor implementation of the plans will be to the detriment of government, in terms of lost fees and taxes; the environment, in terms of lost ecosystems and rare species; and the communities of southern México, in terms of uprooted homes, cultural traditions and livelihoods.

Although the CBM and the PPP ideally will work jointly for a mutual goal of sustainable development, it is clear that the plans were devised independently of each other and neither seems particularly disposed to compromising its own singular end goal. Whether that end goal is conservation or economic development, the role of affected communities is little more than an afterthought in both plans. In fact, this is where the two plans coincide the most. In a worst-case scenario, the CBM will plan Core and Corridor Zones in areas that need to be ?re-wilded.? Local communities will then be moved into new urban resettlements, where they will work in industrial jobs, probably maquilas, created through the development initiatives of the PPP. Both plans would benefit greatly from making greater efforts to incorporate the values of the other into their initiatives, and from allowing the affected communities to participate as active stakeholders. If the communities are treated as little more than an ecological detriment or human capital, they will resort to the region?s long history of resistance and attempt to foil the objectives of both plans.

One of the most basic structural problems for proper integration of the PPP and the CBM is the issue of differing geographical coverage. Whereas the Plan Puebla-Panamá includes the states of Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz and Yucatán, the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano includes only Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Yucatán. The four states included in the Plan but not the Corredor are not less in need of ecological conservation projects. In fact, Veracruz is one of Mexico?s states richest in biodiversity that is in greatest danger of suffering major ecological damage. The implementation of an economic development plan without special deference paid to the state?s environmental needs could exacerbate this problem. Another state excluded from the Corredor with serious environmental regulation and degradation issues is Guerrero. Guerrero has also had considerable conflict in recent years over environmental conservation. Local communities who previously practiced slash-and-burn agriculture became steadfast environmentalists when they became aware of the ecological damage from Boise Cascade?s exploitation of their forests. The Organization of Campesino Environmentalists was created to fight back, and found success until the Mexican military arrested its co-founders, Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera. The two were recently released as a result of public outcry from the assassination of their lawyer, Digna Ochoa, but major problems of ecological conservation and community representation in Guerrero remain that will not be addressed in the Plan Puebla-Panamá.

Activism in Guerrero demonstrates the importance of explicitly creating forums for community participation in decisionmaking for sustainable development. The Plan and the Corredor run the risk of following historically unsuccessful paths in this regard. As Hugo Galleti observed, ?In production, interests of the communities have usually been subordinated to private and parastatal industrial interests. In conservation, protected areas have almost always been declared without taking into account pre-existing claims or occupation by peasant communities.? The land tenure problems for communities in southern México make them the weakest stakeholders; although they often have the most to gain or lose, their needs have historically been subordinate to the decisions of more powerful players.

When considering the affected communities of southern México as stakeholders, one is faced with more problems than other regions with greater stability. The affected communities are a heterogeneous population, comprised of mestizo landowners, traditional indigenous communities that have lived in one area for generations, and recently formed communities of settlers from surrounding areas in México and Guatemala. Because southern México has functioned as a holding area for recent settlers fleeing from poverty and oppression, deciding which communities are legitimate stakeholders is problematic. Decisionmakers often designate legitimate stakeholders as ranchers and those communities who have lived there for generations. Although newer communities and resettlements have less claim to legitimate land tenure, there is nowhere else for them to go. These communities must participate as active stakeholders or the process of forcing them into relocation camps will lead to violent conflict and turn more forests into degraded land in the process.

Even if those indigenous communities with a greater historical claim to the area are not forcibly relocated, they face issues of acculturation and a loss of traditional heritage. Some aspects of the Plan that are not currently receiving major funding but will need to reflect cultural sensitivity in the future are health and sanitation, technical assistance and education. Even with the Plan as it stands today, indigenous communities are finding that their traditional ways of life are being challenged. One problem is that of subsistence hunting in the Maya Forest, where many animal species that have historically flourished are now endangered. Mayan hunters have practiced subsistence hunting for as long as 4,000 years and seem to be hunting today at the same rate as they have been for generations; population growth and poaching, however, are placing a strain on hunting game. A recent study of Mayan hunters in Quintana Roo points to declining species to suggest the need for implementation of increased enforcement and regulations on hunting at a nationwide level to prevent species extinction.

Although Jorgenson?s study recommended increasing enforcement for such measures by national police, this fails to take the political environment in southern México into account. Local communities tend to view federal police as corrupt enemies whose sole purpose is to extort money from poor communities. Perhaps a better method would be to allow ejidos greater capacity to regulate themselves. In 1995, communities in Guerrero met and decided that Agreement 169 of the Organización International del Trabajo gave them a legal basis to police themselves. Despite notable hostility from the federal government, sixty communities have joined the Policía Comunitaria to maintain order themselves. Since the inception of the Policía Comunitaria, crime is down by 90%; communities credit their program of reeducation, in which delinquents perform community service and are mentored by their elders, rather than sent to jail. The Mexican government should reconsider its animosity towards community policing, because it means less cost in terms of paying police or the army to patrol on a more regular basis.

In order for actions such as hunting regulations to be fully implemented and supported by local communities, the PPP and CBM must provide a means for community participation in decisionmaking (preferably at the formative stages of the plans). Instead, the Plan Puebla-Panamá in particular has alienated many communities. Subcomandante Marcos of the EZLN, with support of many communities on his stance towards the Plan, offers a stark vision of the Plan Puebla-Panamá.

This plan is nothing like what Fox says. It?s the worst image of a banana republic: a brutal looting of nature, a brutal exploitation of the people, that signifies, one way or the other, rolling back the hands of time to the history of colonial México, when destroying anything that there was to destroy didn?t matter if the destruction meant profits, when to annihilate thousands of human beings didn?t matter if it signified profits.

Without attempting to determine the veracity of these claims, Marcos? allegation serves to illustrate the local hostility created when large governing bodies create monolithic plans encompassing a region without regard for the people who live there.

Forums for community participation are included in the Plan?s objectives, but thus far local stakeholders have not been successfully engaged in dialogue and decisionmaking about the Plan. For example, one of the first attempts at community participation for the Plan in southern México failed because the federal government neglected to include local government. During the third week of April 2001, notices circulated inviting institutions, NGOs, and the general public to participate in public forums in each of the nine states included in the Plan. Those in less accessible, more rural areas received the news just in time to leave for long journeys to their local capitals. In Oaxaca, the National Indigenous Institute, the federal agency, was to host the event. On the morning the meeting was scheduled, April 27, 2001, the governor canceled the event, apparently because of resentment of the PAN-led event in PRI-dominated territory. The aborted event was never rescheduled.

Rather than view the affected communities as active participants in the process, the PPP and CBM prefer to consider them as little more than a complacent, migratory workforce. The Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano does offer some positions for affected communities in ecotourism and sustainable farming in Buffer and Multi-Use Zones, but the level of activity envisioned cannot create enough livelihoods to support the communities who already live in those areas, let alone those who will be forced to relocate from Core and Corridor Zones. Meanwhile, one of the primary ways that the Plan intends to attract private investors to the area is through urbanization, the ?re-population? of campesinos to urbanized centers where they can work in maquilas at low wages. This is the livelihood that all those living in areas to be ?re-wilded? will be forced into.

Another way to think about the problem is to compare the actions the Mexican government is considering for the campesinos in southeastern México with the actions of the U.S. government for Midwestern ranchers and other property owners. In both areas, considerable efforts are underway to save disappearing habitats and species from extinction through preservation. While activities of both Midwestern ranchers and campesinos have undoubtedly led to land degradation, the undisputed property rights ranchers have means that they have greater control over their land. In many cases, these ranchers have the power to stall or stop conservation initiatives that might interfere with their way of life; if they cannot stop the initiatives, the federal government compensates them for any potential loss of income. The campesinos, on the other hand, have usufruct land rights at best and cannot change government plans. In fact, a major reason why Mesoamerica may be the first successful international corridor system is due to the tenuous land rights of the area?s inhabitants. Thus far, in cases where the Mexican government has implemented regulations on land use, ejidos unsuccessfully demand compensation for expropriation of their land rights, while illegal loggers and poachers continue to benefit from lax law enforcement. Most importantly, the U.S. government could never force Midwestern ranchers to give up their land without their consent and significant compensation. The Mexican government creates the fundamental justification for its actions in defining campesino communities in opposition to sustainable development. Blaming the campesinos for damage to ecological systems deflects criticism from larger environmental offenders, such as ranchers and private corporations involved in natural resource exploitation, while simultaneously providing a justification for forced urbanization of poor communities, facilitating plans for sweatshop labor. In this scenario, the campesinos must be separated from the land they live on in order to save it. Ironically, no action or regulations have been offered to conserve fragile ecosystems from the effects of ranchers, poachers, or private corporations involved in timber clearcutting and mining.

When criticizing the environmental effects of relocated communities, one must consider the level of poverty and social problems that forced people to new land where they practiced slash-and-burn agricultural methods. If anything, the ranchers deserve a greater share of the blame for teaching slash-and-burn methods to peons who worked on their ranches than the peons who eventually gave themselves a measure of autonomy and repeated what they had learned in order to survive. Indigenous communities also sometimes use an agricultural system of rotating plots of land; although this system has worked in their communities for generations, overpopulation is leading to land degradation because plots of land no longer have the same amount of time to recover before being used again. This is not the fault of the communities, however, but socio-economic factors that have brought massive migration to the area. In a discussion of uprooting such communities because of the environmental damage they have caused, environmentalists should consider the consequence of forced expulsion, both in terms of lives lost from violent resistance and repression and ecological damage, as evidenced by the consequences of the declaration of the Lancandón forest.

Early evidence points to the failure of the federal government to take these factors into account when preparing for development and conservation in southern México. Already, La Jornada reports that as many as 49 communities, many of whom are open Zapatista sympathizers, will be expelled from their homes in the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve because ?están ocasionando un severo daño al ecosistema de la región.? The government report, La Problemática de Montes Azules, also asserts that some of the communities in the area are engaged in the cultivation of illicit drugs; this is apparently further justification to expel the communities from their homes. According to the Zapatistas, the so-called ?Guardianes de la Reserva? are nothing but paramilitary forces that have been accumulating in the Biosphere Reserve since 2000 with the explicit goal of forcing communities to leave their homes. The Zapatistas further allege that the Plan Puebla-Panamá was created with the illicit plan of resettlement camps for campesino communities throughout southern México. Regardless of extant political factors in the actions of the federal government, the negative effects for both ecological conservation and economic development that local government and communities could also profit from are unavoidable. The Mexican government must reconsider its stance towards affected communities immediately if southern México is to have any hope of reaping benefits from development, rather than destroy homes and ecosystems in order to attract private investment.

In the initiatives to create infrastructure that will encourage private investment, the Plan Puebla-Panamá promises to destroy homes and cause environmental damage. Because they will change the landscape and basic ways of life in southeastern México, the energy and transportation infrastructure plans are those that have the greatest potential to work to the detriment of the region.

Southeastern México, particularly Chiapas, already provides the rest of the nation with the bulk of its hydroelectric power. The Plan Puebla-Panamá intends to increase hydroelectric dams in the area; while Plan administrators have not made hard numbers available, it could provide for as many as seventy in Chiapas alone. Certainly, hydropower does have