Chiapas
The Chiapas team spoke with a broad cross section of Chiapan society which included Senator Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, candidate for governor for the Alianza para Chiapas; the campaign team of Senator David David, PRI candidate for governor; IFE state officials and state council members; representatives of Las Abejas, a Christian pacifist organization; members of the Chiapas branch of Alianza Cívica; members of ARIC, a campesino union; and the municipal presidents of Chenalho and Ocosingo. We regret that it was not possible to speak with the autonomous council of Polho due to a high level of tension and insecurity on the day when we were scheduled to meet with them.
1. IFE and the Administration of the Elections
We commend the IFE for its willingness to accredit international observers and for facilitating electoral monitoring. We also recognize its effort to facilitate the vote through the establishment of special polling sites (casillas extraordinarias) to make it possible for people to vote in remote or conflicted areas. Nevertheless, we received reports that the location of some polling places was politically motivated. Members of the ARIC Unión de Uniones Numero Uno claimed that in the past, polling places were situated to make them easily accessible for PRI supporters while opposition supporters were compelled in some cases to travel two or three hours to vote. There was concern that IFE was under political pressure to locate polling places in particular areas and not in others and that the local IFE was linked to the PRI. In fact, one of the serious problems that we perceived was the constant need for opposition supporters to make requests for special polling sites due to the fact that the majority of the polling places were located in PRI communities, when this should not be necessary.
2. Vote Buying and Political Pressure
The nature of some rural communities such as Chenalho, in which one party has dominated the vote and in which the ruling party is identified with the government, directly facilitates the use of public funds for electoral purposes. For example, we were told by the municipal president of Chenalho that he had obtained electrification, roads, and 3 million pesos in productive support subsidies for "his people"–those who had come to him indicating that they were joining la vida institucional, which he explained meant membership in the PRI. Another example of vote buying and political pressure (compra y coacción del voto) includes an explicit attempt to obtain a commitment from public employees in Chiapas to vote for PRI presidential and gubernatorial candidates. In addition we learned that campaign literature for the PRI presidential candidate was inserted into the advertising material for the social program, PROGRESA (See Appendix C for supporting documentation).
There is a widespread belief that receipt of government social programs is conditioned upon committing one’s vote to the party in power. In line with that understanding we found that a number of communities had made an explicit choice to refuse government programs, particularly PROGRESA, so as not to compromise their vote. We were told that PROGRESA was largely confined to communities identified with the offical party.
3. Media
We received detailed information concerning the differential access that parties have to the mass media. The following data comes from a report compiled by the Comisión de Radiodifusión. The statistics for Chiapas indicate that between January 19 and April 8, the PRI received 57.2% of total media time, the Alianza por México, 19.7%, and the Alianza por el Cambio, 10.7%. However, for the period from March 12 to April 8, the figures are as follows: PRI, 75.3%, Alianza por Mexico, 9.9%, and Alianza por el Cambio, 3.6%. These statistics document a sharp increase in the PRI’s already dominant position on the radio as we approach the day of the elections. (See Appendix B for statistics.)
4. Militarization and the Threat of Violence
We observed a high level of military and police presence in Chenalho, Acteal, Polho and Ocosingo. In addition to Mexican army units, we saw municipal, state security, state transit, and federal judicial police personnel, and the presence of the Federal Preventative Police was officially acknowledged to us. We were stopped by the army in the absence of other competent authorities and by personnel representing Immigration at roadblocks maintained by the Mexican Army. We also observed the searching of local vehicles. We received a variety of estimates of the total number of troops in Chiapas, ranging from 30,000 to 60,000. Our experience lends support to a recent story by Herman Bellinghausen in La Journada (May 21, 2000, page 5) which states that there are more than 700 military installations in the region including mixed operation bases, living quarters, commercial centers, encampments, and roadblocks, concentrated in the Tzotzil region of Los Altos and the Lacandon jungle.
One municipal president listed thirteen army bases located near Chenalho, Yabteclum, Colonia La Libertad, Taquecum, Xoyep, Majomut, Colonia Miguel Los Choros, Paraje Acteal Alto, Pareje Chimich, Sane Alom, Pareje Sanem Chon, and Paraje Las Limas. According to the municipal president of Chenalho, the army provides security for elections. However survivors of the Acteal massacre and members of Las Abejas, told us: "We do not think the army should be here. We are scared to death. They fire their guns near the roadblocks, and there are too many army bases." They clearly felt unsafe in the presence of the army and police and emphasized that they will not vote without the special polling places that IFE has promised to supply.
Although the president of the municipal government of Chenalho denied the existence of paramilitary groups, several indigenous communities professed knowledge and fear of these groups. We are concerned that the presence of military and police forces and paramilitary groups will affect voter participation, encouraging abstentions. It is important to bear in mind recent events in the region which will undoubtedly affect voting behavior. Local citizens recalled levels of abstention reaching 70% in the elections of 1997 which were also accompanied by violence (burning of casillas, etc.). If special polling places are not situated close to those who live in zones of conflict and if free access to them is not guaranteed, high levels of abstention are a real possibility.
Conclusion
We conclude that there are very serious challenges facing the process of democratization in Chiapas. Nevertheless, we also found a sincere desire by all of the citizens with whom we spoke to participate in clean elections.
