|
1. Acknowledgements
|
The Global Exchange/Alianza Cívica group for Yucatán consisted of four academics, one lawyer, and a member of the Global Exchange staff. For several days, the group conducted observation of the electoral process in selected urban and rural zones of the state. The Mérida-based Frente Cívico Familiar (FCF) organized meetings with representatives of political parties, non-governmental organizations, and electoral officials, as well as with citizens in the capital city of Mérida and numerous towns to the south and east of the capital. Before returning to Mexico City, the group held a press conference with local print and electronic media to present their preliminary observations.
Yucatán’s current political and economic situation shares similarities with other regions in Mexico yet displays certain distinct features. The state governor is affiliated with the PRI. The majority of the state legislature and most municipalities are governed by members of that party as well. On the other hand, Mérida, the capital and largest city, is controlled by the PAN, which also currently holds several municipal presidencies. The PRD has a lower profile in Yucatán than the PRI and the PAN though it does control several municipal presidencies. About three-fifths of the population lives in a household in which one or more adult members speak Maya. Poverty is particularly high in the agricultural zones, a circumstance which influences the political decision-making process of a large percentage of the state’s population. Most of the individuals we interviewed stressed that militarization does not pose a great obstacle to the electoral process in Yucatán. The group did not have the means to assess local campaign finance or media access, and therefore focused its observation primarily on the organization and administration of the electoral process, and issues related to coercion and vote buying.
1. IFE and the Administration of the Elections
Despite the great efforts of the IFE to disseminate information, train poll watchers, and oversee the electoral process in general, a number of our interviewees voiced frustration with the limited mechanisms and resources available at the local and district levels to guarantee free and fair elections. At the time of our visit in late May, the local IFE had not circulated electronic media spots in Maya or "regional accent" Spanish though it had plans to do so. Printed material with a local flavor was still in the production stage. It is important to note that Yucatec Maya is far more commonly spoken than written, which reinforces the importance of outreach through media other than print.
The selection, training, and participation of poll watchers also emerged as an area of concern. During our visit, IFE was training potential poll watchers who had been named through a nationally-devised system of random selection. The local office of IFE is intent on reducing the rejection and absention rate of trained poll watchers. While the rate of rejection for the state as a whole reached 25 percent in 1997, the level was much higher in districts (for example, the Third Electoral District) that remain of particular concern to IFE. We also found in one district we visited that the wrong individuals had received first-round training, a result of confusion over the procedures for selecting potential poll watchers. Of greater concern were reports we received from individuals who claimed that they were pressured to absent themselves from the poll-watching process by local supporters of the ruling party.
In addition to cititzen poll watchers, each major political party expects to have a presence at the polls, as allowed by law. Representatives of both the PRI and the PAN plan to cover all of the polling places while the PRD hopes to raise its coverage from approximately one-half of all districts in the state during the last federal elections to a higher percentange this year. Parties are responsible for training their own personnel and must supply a list of names to the IFE approximately two weeks before the elections. There were no complaints from the parties to the IFE about the placement of the state’s polling stations, which total almost 1900.
Despite frequent assertions of electoral irregularities, at the time of our visit only ten allegations of federal electoral crimes had been made, though we were told to expect more in the near future. All of these complaints had been made by political parties (9 from the PAN and 1 from the PRI). While state representatives of the PRI suggested to us that opposition groups used unfounded allegations as a means to harass their party, others with whom we spoke expressed concern that fear of retaliation, ignorance about the proper procedure for denoucing electoral crimes and irregularities, and apathy linked to the high cost-benefit ratio of pursuing a denunciation and a general lack of confidence in the process that ensues once a formal allegation is made, had curtailed the denunciation of electoral irregularities.
2. Political Coercion and Vote Buying
The potential for direct manipulation of the polls through the purchase of votes or the absence of a secret ballot appears to have been reduced in Yucatán by changes in the electoral laws and procedures in recent years. However, voter privacy and independence from pressure remain a concern. Our observations of PROCAMPO "ceremonies" in Oxkutzcab and Ticul indicate that the way these resources are distributed provides leverage for the incumbent party. The PROCAMPO distribution in Yucatán was advanced to May this year and thousands of farmers were brought to the larger towns to receive their subsidy and to listen to the governor speak. Signs were hung from the municipal buildings offering thanks from the local population to governor Cervera for programs such as PROCAMPO, PROBECA, and PROGRESA.
The connection of these programs and events to vote buying and political pressure is provided in a recent study of 28 Yucatecan municipalities by the Frente Cívica Familiar. (See Appendix A.) The study’s findings indicate that in over half of the municipalities, citizens who received material support from the state such as farm animals or machinery, school breakfasts, bicycles, sewing machines, or medicine were asked to vote for the incumbent party to give thanks for these "gifts" or they received threats that they would lose material support if the opposition won. The FCF report also noted that in 68% of the municipalities studied, the distribution of social benefits favored members of the party in power. Our interviewees suggested that the misuse of public funds for party purposes had occurred from time to time in municipalites controlled by the opposition as well.
We received reports that the line between the provision of government services and the improper promotion of the party’s fortunes at the polls had been breached in a number of other ways as well. These included, but were not limited to, reports that government officials had told recipients of PROCAMPO, PROBECA, PROGRESA, and government pensions that their participation in these programs was conditional upon their support of the incumbent party or that a loss for the PRI in the upcoming elections would force them out of the program. We also received reports that some of the Maya who received PROCAMPO benefits at large outdoor ceremonies understood themselves to be entering into a public contract for the good of their communities with an obligation to vote for PRI candidates. Interviewees and representatives of organizations also noted that the nature and timing of the distribution of benefits sometimes failed to coincide with program guidelines and objectives, further obscuring the distinction between proactive government policy and partisan electioneering. Finally, according to numerous sources, employees with government contracts were being pressured to recruit supporters for the PRI through their professional networks. In Yucatán, the Red Humana Rural 2000 (Rural Human Network 2000) involves agricultural sector workers, who are asked to promote the PRI candidates for national office among the campesinos to whom they offer services and support, and to form a list of potential recruits for campaign activities and election day. (See Appendix B.) These lists were to be reviewed on a regular basis, with the threat that uncooperative workers may not have their contracts renewed.
Despite clear evidence of political pressure and vote buying efforts, many interviewees insisted that their vote could not be coerced or bought; they would vote for whomever they pleased. Even campesinos who participated in PROCAMPO and other government programs indicated that they felt no obligation to vote for the PRI on that account. Hence, it is difficult to predict with certainty how much effect the foregoing examples of electoral manipulation will have on the actual vote count.
Conclusion
The electoral process in Yucatán reflects the ongoing challenges and contradictions that characterize Mexico generally at this moment. We were impressed by the political vitality in Yucatán, including the widespread awareness of the right to a secret and free ballot, and the increasing attention being paid to the ways in which this right could be defended. However, despite numerous advances in the adminstration of free and fair elections and high levels of competition in some districts, concerns remain in a number of areas. Most importantly, the use of pressure tactics to influence both the electoral process and individual voting behavior in economically marginalized areas of the state needs to be addressed. Additionally, the autonomy and authority of the IFE must be respected by all parties and its outreach programs and information need to reach all citizens in a more timely fashion. Finally, if federal electoral laws and regulations are to have any practical effect, the process by which allegations of wrongdoing are received and acted upon must be accessible and effective.