• The Volatile Socio-Economic and Political Context of Mexico Today
• Militarization of the Mexican Society in Response to Socio-Economic Conditions
• Counterinsurgency
• Reign of Terror with Impunity: Human Rights Abuses and Low Intensity Warfare
• Conclusion
• Section IV Endnotes

The Volatile Socio-economic and Political Context of Mexico Today

Mexico's "structural adjustment" policies (see Section III) since the early 1980s have resulted in massive increases in the extent and depth of poverty while wealth is ever more concentrated. According to the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), there is an inverse relationship between investment and employment in Mexico. The more investment, the less jobs. The worsening socio-economic conditions for ever greater numbers of Mexican citizens create a ticking time bomb as the people desperately seek relief from misery and repression.

The pervasive power of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has been slipping since the rise of the center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) in 1987, and PRI's near loss in the 1988 Presidential elections to PRD candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, a former leader within the PRI. The July 6, 1997 elections produced more bad news for the PRI. For the first time they lost control of the 500-seat lower house of Congress (Chamber of Deputies). They continue to dominate seats in the Senate, but the PRI can no longer approve significant legislation without negotiating with National Action Party (PAN) and PRD opponents. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas was elected the first non-PRI Mayor of Mexico City. The rise of the PRD has been instrumental in the parallel rise of the conservative, long marginalized PAN, which now competes with the PRD as the nation's second electoral force.

The ascent to power of the technocratic faction within the PRI initially led by ex-president Carlos Salinas (l988-l994) and continued by current President Ernesto Zedillo, has caused deep divisions within the old PRI power structures. This technocratic faction is part of the "neoliberal" program that requires close consultations with international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and U.S. Treasury. This erosion of Mexican sovereignty under a NAFTA-driven economy has angered both progressive and reactionary factions within the PRI itself.

So as the socio-economic conditions worsen, and the PRI weakens, there is a dramatic and pervasive mobilization of the civil society from below far larger than the Zapatista uprising. This mobilization challenges the neoliberal, corporate capitalist policies being imposed from above by the technocratic faction of the PRI ruling government and its new alliance with the United States.

Militarization of the Mexican Society in Response to Socio-economic Conditions

The Mexican government possessed large amounts of information as early as 1992 that "guerrilla" insurgency groups were organizing in Chiapas and other regions in southern Mexico. But the Salinas administration did not want known the possibilities of insurrection because it did not want to damage its image of a stable, emerging "First World" nation. Maintaining this image was critical to the final ratification by the U.S. of NAFTA.¹

However, since the January 1, 1994 Zapatista uprising, the militarization of the Mexican society has been dramatic and public. Mexico's military budget was increased by more than 40% after the Chiapas uprising.²

The Mexican army invasion and occupation of much of eastern Chiapas in February 1995 sent more than 25,000 Indigenous fleeing to deeper mountainous areas for safety. U.S.-supplied and financed military hardware and support was extensively used by the Mexican military in this offensive that broke a year-long cease fire.³ (See Section I.)

The Mexican militarization process includes conspicuous deployment of soldiers in cities, towns, on highways, and in the mountains in a number of southern states. Many police, public safety, and other civic functions are being transferred to military officials as part of an expanding counterinsurgency strategy. Military expenditures for arms, transportation, and training are continually increasing. Mexico is training large numbers of its military personnel in foreign military schools, including at the SOA in Georgia, and at the counterinsurgency warfare school in North Carolina, United States. Mexican troop strength has increased to 180,000, and perhaps to well over 200,000, since l994.⁴

Counterinsurgency

In Section I we learned that shortly after the January 1, 1994 Zapatista uprising, there were conversations between Mexican and U.S. officials about Mexico's need for developing a counterinsurgency trained military force.

The Mexican military created a special Rainbow Task Force in summer 1994, apparently trained in counterinsurgency operations⁵ (referenced in Section I), and has been spending considerable amounts on Navstar GPS guidance systems, a critical weapon in satellite warfare, as part of space-age counterinsurgency.⁶ In September 1996, the Mexican daily, El Financiero, obtained a file of 264 secret documents from the Pentagon under the FOIA, confirming that Mexico has been receiving support from military advisors from several countries, including the United States. (See COUNTERINSURGENCY in Section I above.)

It has been reported that mercenaries from Argentina were sent to Mexico's 31st Military Zone in Chiapas in July 1994 to assist the army in perfecting its counterinsurgency tactics. These same Argentinean advisors apparently had earlier worked with the CIA training U.S.-backed Contra terrorists in Honduras.⁷ And Israeli soldiers have apparently been training police forces in the state of Jalisco.⁸ Presence of U.S. advisors training counterinsurgency and paramilitary groups in southern Mexico was reported in l995.⁹

Recently there have been English-language conversations in code recorded in the conflict areas of Chiapas. This raises the question of presence of U.S. personnel, official or unofficial, where the counterinsurgency and military operations have been most intense.¹⁰

As mentioned above, in October 1994 the office of the Mexican Secretary of National Defense is reported to have prepared a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan ("Chiapas '94") that included, among a variety of tactics, training and operating a number of paramilitary groups to "eliminate" and "destroy" the Zapatista insurgency, and the Zapatista bases of support. See Sunday, January 4, 1998 issue of Proceso, the respected Mexican weekly news magazine.¹¹ The first paramilitary groups were apparently recruited and trained in early 1995.¹² Mexican officials now acknowledge existence of a dozen paramilitary groups in Chiapas, armed and operating from rural training camps.¹³ Formal relationships between the state government of Chiapas, the army, and paramilitary groups have been revealed, especially with the Peace and Justice ("Paz y Justicia") group in northern Chiapas.¹⁴

The October 1994 Mexican National Defense counterinsurgency plan contains the following essential components:

1. Secret organization of certain sectors of the civilian population, including ranchers and small business owners, to support military campaign operations;

2. Training and support of self-defense forces or other paramilitary organizations;

3. Exercise direction and control over all Public Security forces, making them responsible for elimination of village and urban rebels and the disintegration and control of the popular organizations;

4. Destroy and eliminate the Zapatistas while isolating them from and breaking the support relationship with the civilian population ("neutralization");

5. Tactfully manage and censor the media; and

6. Limit the negative effects that human rights organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have the capacity to develop.

The counterinsurgency campaign plan also identifies the Catholic Diocese of San Cristobal and its teachings of liberation theology as a major cause of the Indigenous uprising. The Indigenous demands for autonomy, the plan warns, endangers social peace and tranquility, and worse, directly threatens the sovereignty, integrity and independence of Mexico.¹⁵

General Mario Renan Castillo, who stepped down in November 1997 as commander of the Seventh Military Region in Chiapas, is believed to be the most significant collaborator with the U.S. in developing Mexican counterinsurgency doctrines in response to Indigenous insurgencies. Trained in the past at the counterinsurgency warfare school at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, he was appointed head of the Seventh Military Region in February 1995.¹⁶ Known for his familiarity with psychological warfare, and affinity for "Low Intensity" conflict as part of counterinsurgency doctrine, he has been President Zedillo's chief coordinator of the February 9, 1995 military invasion of all perceived Zapatista communities and their continued occupation since.¹⁷ Meanwhile, recruitment, training and arming of as many as 12 paramilitary groups has occurred since the very beginning of Castillo's reign in Chiapas. The paramilitarization of much of Chiapas has resulted in a brutal and systematic campaign of terror and repression under the protection of Castillo's military forces which have encircled and occupied much of the region with assistance of various police security units. The unaccountable paramilitaries' actions have relieved Zedillo's and Castillo's public military forces of the shameful and despicable but important task (in counterinsurgency doctrine) of terrorizing (into hoped-for submission as an alternative to their elimination) the numerous Indigenous communities seeking democratic autonomy and justice. General Castillo's friendship with the paramilitary forces is illustrated by the fact that he proudly displayed two posters promoting the "Paz y Justicia" paramilitary group at his office in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas, and his presence as an "honorary witness" when Chiapas Governor Ruiz Ferro formally turned over 4,600,000 pesos (nearly $600,000 U.S.) to "Paz y Justicia" through its PRI leader Sanchez on July 4, 1997.¹⁸ A few days before Castillo stepped down from the Seventh Military Region, "Paz y Justicia" gave him a going away party with the words, "We will never forget you, sir, for all that you have done for us."¹⁹

Conservative estimates suggest 1500 assassinations/murders in the two years leading up to the Acteal, Chiapas massacre on December 22, 1997.²⁰ The National Mediation Commission (CONAI) has clear evidence that at least 60 communities have been subjected to numerous thefts, and regular campaigns of murders and house burnings.²¹

Under Castillo, the new GAFE (Airmobile Special Forces Group) units have been in training at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, and are now operating in most or all of Mexico's 12 military regions and 40 zones. (See Section I portion on "Military Training, Especially Counterinsurgency.") Experts familiar with the history of units throughout the Hemisphere and world trained by the U.S., including by the CIA and Green Berets at or from Ft. Bragg in counterinsurgency doctrines, know the central importance of paramilitary operations and terrorism in subduing "insurgent" communities.²² Some of the most demonic cases of human rights violations have been committed by military and paramilitary forces trained in counterinsurgency and terror campaigns by the CIA and the U.S. military.

In support of this stepped up campaign of counterinsurgency operations, President Zedillo requested in 1995 a sophisticated array of military equipment worth $237 million to reinforce capacities of the army and Attorney General's office, allegedly for the drug war. However, as was discussed in Section I above, drug training and military equipment are equally applicable to counterinsurgency operations. This 1995 military request included $82 million for 3 additional radar sites, $140 million for 10 night helicopters and 2 night fixed wing aircraft along with 12,000 M-16 automatic rifles, and $15 million for a satellite network and remote stations for 52 connection sites.²³

The sophistication of counterinsurgency operations is part of a radical change of Mexican military doctrine toward a "national security" focus where intelligence gathering and counterintelligence are becoming far more important. This enables the Mexican government to identify the strength and activities of insurgents (internal "enemies"), to plan strategic patrols in conflict zones, and to train troops in gathering information on "subversive" and insurgent groups.²⁴

Mexico's future under a NAFTA-driven economy rests on the capability of Mexico's army to maintain internal security while simultaneously suppressing the present and almost inevitable increasing future threats of insurrection. Potential for sabotage and disruption of Mexico's resources are enormous, including Mexico City's vulnerable water supply and power sources, according to Col. Rex Applegate.²⁵ Other vulnerable resources cited by Col. Applegate are 16,000 miles of railroads, 146,000 miles of roads, 100 airfields with scheduled flights, 50,000 miles of oil pipeline, and 8,000 miles of gas lines. Mexico's petroleum and petrochemical operations in Vera Cruz, Tabasco, and Chiapas, are other resources requiring serious priority for an army that is becoming increasingly distracted by multiple insurgencies.²⁶ Thus sophisticated surveillance and counterinsurgency have become indispensable as Mexico seeks to become a "stable" and equal "free" trading partner with the U.S. and Canada.

Chiapas is almost completely occupied by the military, suggesting consolidation in this state of Mexico's new counterinsurgency strategy. There are at least 40 military camps in which minimally 25,000 soldiers

are housed, with perhaps another 40,000 troops in the area. About 80% of the Zapatista communities in the Conflict Zone are daily monitored by military camps, most of which possess helicopter landing pads. In this zone there are 25 infantry and mobilized battalions as well as 2 dozen groups of special operations, supply centers, and construction engineers. This tight consolidation has occurred under the protection of the nearly two-year period of fragile peace assured by the Law of Dialogue and Reconciliation in which peace talks have occurred at San Andres Larrainzar.²⁷

The army has also nearly completed construction of paved highways that encircle and bisect the Zapatista Conflict Zone.²⁸

Reign of Terror with Impunity: Human Rights Abuses and Low Intensity Warfare

The December 22, 1997 massacre at Acteal, Chiapas was a predictable outcome of Mexican President Zedillo's strong military and counterinsurgency/paramilitary policy that has virtually preempted any "peace" process. Since the February 9, 1995 military invasion and subsequent occupation of much of Chiapas, Zedillo's administration has given only lip service to the peace process. The facade of being engaged in a dialogue for peace enabled the military to encircle and contain the Indigenous communities affiliated with the Zapatistas. Earlier we learned that Zedillo acknowledged at the time of the Clinton-orchestrated bailout of the Mexican economy (Mexican stock market and banks) that his army was not equipped for a prolonged military campaign in the jungle. U.S. military officials promised extensive counterinsurgency training from 1996-1999 so that the Mexican army would become fully capable of sophisticated jungle warfare. Meanwhile, emergence of the paramilitary groups recruited, trained and armed by members of the Mexican military began to operate their terror campaign protected by the army which was located in numerous camps and convoys in and around virtually every Indigenous community. The October 1994 defense ministry document, "Chiapas '94," outlined a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan (see above) which clearly identifies the importance of creating and maintaining paramilitary groups to "neutralize" the Zapatistas. Acteal was waiting to happen. Others await!

Refugees now numbering in the thousands in central and northern Chiapas have all been brutally and systematically expelled from numerous communities sympathetic with the Zapatistas. This is part of the intention of the Mexican military's counterinsurgency plan to destroy the Zapatistas through isolating them and breaking the support relationships with the civilian population. The fact that this systematic terrorism and expulsion is primarily being carried out by unaccountable paramilitary groups with total impunity (and complicity with the military and public security forces) pretends to offer the army and Zedillo a public image, outside of Chiapas, relatively free of grotesque brutality. The hundreds of murder victims of the paramilitary have often been witnessed by the protective encirclement of the nearby military and public security forces.

Rigoberto Menchu, the Guatemalan Indigenous leader who won the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize, has noted many similarities between the counterinsurgency campaigns in southern Mexico and the violent 30-year civil war in Guatemala. Menchu identified the government exploitation of community divisions, the creation of paramilitary groups, daily armed harassments, and regular killings, as similarities.

Recently Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo and his new foreign minister, Rosario Green, each condemned the presence of "foreigners" in strife-torn Chiapas, declaring that "internationalization" of the Chiapas conflict threatens Mexico's sovereignty. This issue has been intensified during February 1998 as the Mexican government expelled three U.S. citizens involved in humanitarian and cultural work and one French Catholic priest. One of the U.S. citizens expelled was forcefully kidnapped into an unmarked car by plainclothesmen and taken to a windowless jail cell where he was interrogated overnight.

The military occupies most of the Lacandon Jungle in eastern Chiapas and the central valleys (cañadas), and is increasingly present in the more northern regions between central Chiapas and Tabasco. Human rights and religious workers report that the official security forces, police units and army openly tolerate, even seemingly encourage, arbitrary road blocks and detentions, intimidation, harassment, theft, violence and murder of local inhabitants by violent paramilitary groups.

One of the best indicators of the seriousness of repression being unleashed on various sectors of the Mexican society is the number of human rights violations being reported to official agencies. Of course, official reports of human rights violations amount to but a small percentage of the total abuses that occur on a daily basis throughout much of Mexico.

Between January and October 1996, Amnesty International (AI) sent out 60 "urgent appeals" concerning human rights abuses in Mexico, a record number for Latin America.²⁹ For decades, Mexico has rejected international criticism of its human rights record as interference in its sovereign affairs. Until 1996, Mexico was the only Latin American nation that had refused entrance to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS). Finally, in July 1996, the OAS human rights delegation was allowed in. They were able to visit the states of Guerrero and Chiapas and found an extensive pattern of abuses that included torture, murder, and regular harassment of human rights monitors by both police and the Mexican military.³⁰

The opposition PRD claims that over 400 of their Party activists have been murdered since 1988; 70 of them in the state of Guerrero since 1993.³¹

The Mexican army is known for its numerous human rights violations and enjoys full impunity for its actions, according to Carlos M. Salinas, AI's representative for Latin America.³² A popular Mexican General and former Mexican national Olympic athlete, General Gallardo, reported publicly about a number of human rights abuses committed by the army. He declared the situation serious enough to justify creation of an army human rights ombudsman office. The Mexican government imprisoned this general for a number of alleged violations after he spoke out.³³ In March 1998, General Gallardo was convicted of "corruption and illegal enrichment" despite "contradictory testimony" and "inconclusive evidence," and received two separate prison sentences of 14 years each.³⁴

This army pattern of abuse has existed for some time. Testimony in 1989 by a former Mexican soldier before the Canadian Immigration Board indicated his participation in a secret military unit that murdered at least 60 potential dissidents in the late 1970s and early 1980s. He identified the two Mexican officials in charge of this internal army security unit. As late as 1989, these officials served as Mexican Interior Minister and the Chief of Political Intelligence for the Federal District, respectively.³⁵

Observers have concluded that the various Mexican security forces, including the army, have justified violent repression of civilians by claiming fears of armed, "leftist" insurgencies. However, victims of these abuses claim that they are targeted simply because they have spoken out against the PRI's undemocratic and unjust policies. Americas Watch has concluded that the greater threat to Mexico's national security is the undisciplined, corrupt and violent practices of elements of her police and security forces.³⁶

An interview with staff of CONPAZ, a coordinating agency for a number of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) working in Chiapas, revealed a 1995 documented record of the paramilitary, state police, federal police, and army in Chiapas as follows: 300 forced evictions, 1,400 illegal detentions, 1,200 houses burned, and 605 assassinations of campesinos.

Since 1994, CONPAZ has noted an expansion and sophistication of violence in Chiapas, including the proliferation of violent groups. This trend corresponds with the notable increase since 1994 of foreign assistance to the Mexican armed forces.

On November 7, 1996, the Commission for Follow-Up and Verification (COSEVE), responsible for overseeing the implementation of the San Andres Peace Accords of February 1996, opened their office in San Cristobal. This was a significant development in the peace process. Immediately an outbreak of a pattern of violence occurred throughout Chiapas, believed to be an attempt to thwart any success of peace. Fighting broke out in San Andres Larrainzar, the town which has hosted the historic peace talks between the government and Zapatistas. Groups of campesinos clashed in Amatenange del Valle. In San Cristobal, molotov cocktails were thrown at the door of the church of Santo Domingo and at several restaurants and stores identified as pro-Zapatista. The military and police coordinated attacks against campesinos protesting the NAFTA-induced low price of corn in the municipality of Venustiano Carranzas. Three of the campesinos were killed. It is believed that U.S.-furnished helicopters were utilized as part of the repression of this nonviolent demonstration.³⁷

Some observers fear the beginning of a scorched earth, Guatemala-style counterinsurgency policy after the army burned 15 Indigenous homes in Santa Cruz Yucucani.³⁸

According to a November 1996 report of Global Exchange, which has an office in San Cristobal, human rights and peace workers believe that the escalated assaults and terror in November came from groups that reach beyond the local interests of San Cristobal or even Chiapas. The terror campaign against CONPAZ included a fire bomb attack on their main office and the abduction of the organization's accountant and his family to a location 50 miles distant where they were tortured and "interrogated" for two days. Telephone lines were cut at four NGO workers' homes, and dozens of telephone death threats were reported by 30 workers from CONPAZ and other peace organizations, creating a climate of fear for any human rights activist in Chiapas.

The evidence suggests, according to NGO representatives, that the attackers are professionals with training in intelligence gathering and covert assaults. They believe this pattern is the work of a military/paramilitary intelligence unit under orders of hard line factions within the Chiapas State and/or Mexican federal government. The November attacks, they profess, required access to internal information and good coordination. Representatives of the Zapatistas at the peace talks with the government have documented that increases in violence correspond chronologically with the periodic peace talks. They assert that the pattern is not a coincidence but instead part of a coordinated effort to derail the peace process and create a continued heightened climate of fear.³⁹

Visitors from the United States and other countries in Chiapas have also noted abusive behaviors on the part of the Mexican military, police units, and paramilitary forces. A California photographer interested in Mayan weaving patterns visited a variety of women's weaving cooperatives in 1996. This photographer discovered that a number of these cooperatives had been destroyed through a pattern of violent break-ins by state police as well as goon squads. Sewing machines, looms, woven articles, yarn, typewriters, and cash have routinely been stolen or destroyed. This sabotage does not end with destruction of physical property. Kidnappings, tortures, and murders have also occurred, sending chills of terror through the region, against anyone who dares to promote local economic self-sufficiency and autonomy.⁴⁰

This same photographer was present in a remote Indigenous village with her 24-year-old son in November 1996 when an army convoy entered the community. One of the military trucks, in defiance of the Law of Dialogue and Reconciliation which prohibits military convoys from stopping in Indigenous villages, slammed on its brakes. A ranking officer jumped out of the cab with his automatic weapon pointed at the bystanders. He ordered termination of all note taking and photographs prior to jumping back into the truck and speeding off. Note taking and photographs are protected under the Law of Dialogue. A short time later this same military truck returned and the same officer angrily jumped out pointing his rifle directly at the several Europeans present along with the two people from the U.S. The officer then thrust his rifle toward the face of each of the witnesses, loudly asking, "Do you have a problem? Do you have a problem? Do you have a problem?" Some of the soldiers standing in the back of the truck were seen nervously covering their faces as though they didn't want to be identified if something terrible was going to happen. Then, as suddenly as the officer had jumped out of the truck, he jumped into the truck and raced off.⁴¹ This represents the kind of tense and dangerous situation experienced by the local Indigenous on a daily basis.

A California college student studying Indigenous health practices was present in the Indigenous community mentioned above in July 1996 when he witnessed a Mexican military helicopter hovering in a menacing way over the village. He reported that automatic weapons were visibly extended from the doors of the chopper, aimed at the fragile buildings made of poles hewn with machetes, as women and children stood frightened next to their small houses.⁴²

Conclusion

The Mexican militarization includes a reign of terror consistent with counterinsurgency and "low intensity" warfare, intended to subjugate whole populations into compliance with an ideology and politics against their will, against their autonomy. It is this militarization process and policy of repression that the United States is supporting to assure "stability" for the Mexican NAFTA-driven economy.

Section IV Endnotes

1. "Mexico Knew in 1992 of a Rebel Threat," The Boston Globe (Jan. 12, 1994).
2. "Mexico Military Assumes More Visible Role Throughout Country," The Sunday Herald, Monterey, CA (July 28, 1996).
3. La Jornada (Sept. 17, 1996); Jeffrey St. Clair, Inter Press Service, English News Wire (Jan. 14, 1997).
4. Los Angeles Times (Jan. 19, 1997); Carlos Fazio Salvador Carro, The Third Link (1996).
5. Los Angeles Times (Jan. 19, 1997); 97 declassified U.S. DIA documents reported in Proceso (May 11, 1997).
6. Jane's 1995 Intelligence Review.
7. Darrin Wood, "Mexico Practices What School of the Americas Teaches," Covert Action Quarterly (Winter 1996-97).
8. Nuevo Amanecer Press USA/Mex (Nov. 2, 1996).
9. La Jornada (Nov. 7, 1995).
10. Audio recording in English language transcribed directly from a CB from a vehicle in Las Margaritas conflict area, Chiapas, Mexico, early January 1998.
11. AP story, "Mexican Military Steps Up Searches," Santa Cruz County Sentinel (Jan. 5, 1998); "Political Shakeup in Chiapas," San Francisco Chronicle (Jan. 8, 1998).
12. "Pro-PRI Gangs Breed Fear, Potential Chaos in Chiapas," Los Angeles Times (Jan. 25, 1998).
13. "Mexico Says Chiapas Rife with Paramilitary Groups," Reuters wire story (Jan. 23, 1995, story posted on Internet).
14. See "NAFTA versus Life: U.S. Complicity with Mexico in Waging a Final Solution (Genocidal War) to the Indigenous 'Problem,'" A Report of the War Veterans Delegation to Southern Mexico, April 7-24, 1997, in which delegation members (this author included) describe presence of two posters supporting the "Paz y Justicia" paramilitary group on the wall in the waiting room of General Mario Renan Castillo, then Commander of the Seventh Regional Military Headquarters in Chiapas, at his office in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas, on Friday, April 11, 1997; "Preliminary Report from Chiapas Schools Construction Teams," Craftsmen's Hall, 3909 Centre St., San Diego, CA 92103, (619) 232-2841 (Jan. 15, 1998), in which members of their Trinational Emergency Delegation for Peace in Chiapas, Jan. 7-Jan. 11, 1998, report seeing the same two posters supporting "Paz y Justicia" paramilitary group on their unsuccessful attempt on January 10, 1998 to visit a military spokesperson at the same Seventh Regional Military Headquarters in Tuxtla Gutierrez; "Ruiz Ferro and the Paramilitaries: Relations Exposed," Masiosare Sunday Supplement of Mexican Daily, La Jornada (Dec. 21, 1997), reporting the formal agreement signed July 4, 1997 between then--Chiapas Governor Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro and the PRI Deputy, Samuel Sanchez Sanchez, founder and director of the paramilitary group, "Paz y Justicia," in which the governor handed over 4,600,000 pesos (about $600,000 in U.S.) to Sanchez for various promises, including not to commit violence during and after the then impending July 6 Mexican elections. General Renan Castillo was present at the signing ceremony as an "honorary witness."
15. "Military Plan for Militaries" by Carlos Marin, Proceso (Sun., Jan. 4, 1998), further elaborated by Darrin Wood, Director, Nuevo Amanecer Press-Europa (NAP-E) (Jan. 8, 1998).
16. "Paramilitary Groups in Chiapas: Under the Doctrine from Ft. Bragg," by Darrin Wood, NAP-E, Masiosare, Sunday Supplement of Mexican daily, La Jornada (Jan. 11, 1998).
17. Author's conversations with Onesimo Hidalgo, esquire, with CIACH (Center of Information and Analysis of Chiapas), San Cristobal de Las Casas, April 9, 1997.
18. See footnote 14 above.
19. "Paramilitary Groups in Chiapas: Under the Doctrine from Ft. Bragg," by Darrin Wood, NAP-E, Masiosare, Sunday Supplement of Mexican daily La Jornada (Jan. 11, 1998).
20. Alejandro Nadal, "Terror in Chiapas," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March/April 1998), p. 21.
21. Ibid.
22. See issues of both Special Warfare and The Professional Bulletin of the U.S. Army, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC; U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, "Stability and Support Operation," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Levenworth, KS (1997).
23. El Financiero (Aug. 29, 1995).
24. Carlos Fazio Salvador Carro, The Third Link (1996).
25. Col. Rex Applegate, "Time Bomb On the U.S. Border," posted to Chiapas-L, Internet (Nov. 29, 1995).
26. Applegate (Nov. 29, 1995).
27. La Jornada (Feb. 10, 12, 13, 1997).
28. La Jornada (Feb. 10, 12, 13, 1997).
29. Proceso (Oct. 20, 1996).
30. The New York Times (July 25, 1996).
31. Latin American Working Group Legislative Update (Nov. 5, 1996); "Mexico Journal," Crosswinds, Albuquerque, NM (May 1996).
32. San Francisco Chronicle (Dec. 10, 1996).
33. National Public Radio report (Jan. 24, 1997).
34. "Mexican Officer, Critic of Army, Is Sentenced to 14 Years in Theft," The New York Times (March 12, 1998); "Dissident General Court-Martialed Again," San Francisco Chronicle (March 31, 1998).
35. "Former Mexican Soldier Describes Execution," The New York Times (Feb. 19, 1989).
36. Americas Watch, Human Rights in Mexico (1990); Tom Barry, ed., Mexico: A Country Guide (Albuquerque, NM: The Inter-Hemispheric Resource Center, 1992), p. 62.
37. SIPAZ Report (Jan. 1997).
38. Nuevo Amanecer Press USA/Mex (Nov. 2, 1996).
39. Global Exchange Report, Chiapas (Nov. 1996).
40. Joanne Calkins, Santa Cruz, CA, Death of a Dream: Violence Against Women's Cooperatives in Chiapas (Jan. 1997).
41. Joanne Calkins, Confrontation with the Mexican Military (Jan. 1997).
42. Chris Fink, Santa Cruz, CA, Encounter with the Military (Jan. 1997).