The United States wants to refocus its Afghanistan effort on the local army and police, but there are serious questions about a strategy that has also run into problems of desertions, sectarianism and graft in Iraq.

A much-heralded U.S. handover of weapons, vehicles and other materiel in Kabul last week -- the biggest ever with 12,000 guns and hundreds of vehicles -- was as telling for what was held back as for what was given.

"This move is geared toward NATO's overall strategy of eventually being able to hand over security to some form of native force so that NATO can leave -- but, realistically, this cannot happen for years," U.S. think tank Stratfor.com said.

"Humvees and machine guns will give the ANA (Afghan National Army) enhanced mobility and better firepower, but -- unlike heavier weapons, such as armored fighting vehicles and artillery -- they do not indicate that NATO especially trusts the ANA."

The 40,000-strong Afghan army still relies on the almost 45,000 foreign troops for air support, major transport, artillery and medical evacuations.

Even now, in some joint bases U.S. forces operate separately run and separately guarded camps within camps, keeping Afghan soldiers outside the wire.

A popular conspiracy theory here is that the United States is obstructing the formation of a local air force through fear of a an attack by a rogue pilot.

SUPPORT FROM RURAL AFGHANS

NATO and U.S. forces have been heavily criticized for civilian deaths, mainly from air raids, because they cannot always tell friend from foe. Some Afghans say foreign troops are misled and misdirected to settle tribal and ethnic rows.

Many analysts say a strong, efficient and graft-free army and police are vital to winning support from rural Afghans.

"Where there is a reputation historically in Afghanistan, it is of course a strong will of resisting external forces," said Sean Kay, a security expert and professor of international relations at Ohio Wesleyan University in the United States.

"We stand a much better hope of tipping the balance of hearts and minds in the south if it is the Afghan army and police that are taking the fight there."

The expansion of the Afghan army is being accelerated to reach its targeted 70,000 next year instead of 2010. But this compares with the 120,000 in the Iraqi army for a smaller country, smaller population and easier fighting terrain.

With the new equipment and an extra $8.6 billion pledged by the Bush administration for the Afghan security forces, Stratfor says they will play a more active role in 2007.

After the bloodiest year since U.S.-led forces ousted the Taliban in 2001, the guerrillas are expected to launch a major offensive this year, bolstered by safe havens in Pakistan and money from drug barons enjoying ever increasing opium crops.

Despite desertions -- some to the Taliban -- and other problems, the army is considered a relative success and largely multiethnic in a nation where tribal loyalties are paramount.

Not so the police, paid less than Taliban fighters. They are accused of rampant corruption -- from traffic bribes in Kabul to working with opium barons and smugglers -- and the presidential palace has overruled some vetting, citing political necessity.

PREDATORY BEHAVIOR

"Little more than private militias, they are regarded in nearly every district more as a source of insecurity than protection," the International Crisis Group said of the police in its latest report. "Instead of gaining the confidence of communities, their often-predatory behavior alienates locals further."

Efforts to raise a separate auxiliary police force are helping. Officially 65,000, although really far fewer, the main force is badly equipped and paid, if paid at all.

NATO, the United States and Afghan officials stress the main priority is reconstruction and building an economy, not security.

"Whether the main thrust and focus should be on the army and police is, I think, open to question," said Hamidullah Tarzi, an academic, government adviser and former minister.

"Will that have more of a counter-reaction? I can't frankly see in what way it would be able to solve some of the problems we're facing now, which are political problems, ethnic problems, tribal problems."

Tarzi said the United States may think its policy of more military might in Iraq may speed peace if it was applied in Afghaninstan, as well.

"It is the wrong shortcut," he said. "The socio-economic aspect is the most important. Going after the military (option) is like chasing a wild goose."